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The big shocks of the last few years, as the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-09 and the Sovereign 
Debt Crisis of 2010-12, have highlighted the interconnection between the conditions of the 
banking system and the macroeconomy.  
Therefore, the analysis of the main factors that impact on bank profitability and financial 
stability has drawn the attention of the decision makers and researchers since the banking sector 
is of crucial importance for developing a national economy and establishing its financial 
stability.  
When giving a speech on the “Challenges for bank profitability” on 1st May 2019, the Vice-
President of the ECB Luis de Guindos claimed that “Bank profitability is important because 
bank profitability matters for financial stability.” This sentence is one among many which 
illustrate the concern of policymakers on bank profitability based on the view that the latter 
favors financial stability.  
Analyzing the banking sector, profitability is an important condition both from a shareholder’s 
and regulator’s point of view. From an investor’s perspective, profitability is important to 
generate a return from investments, while from a regulatory point of view it is important to 
guarantee good solvency ratios even in the case of a risky business environment, which in turn 
guarantees stability for the banking system and allows to avoid problems in the real economy. 
The bank profitability is reflected in the majority of empirical studies by the return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), risk adjusted returns, and the price to book ratio (as a proxy 
for charter value). A sound and profitable banking sector is better able to withstand negative 
shocks and contribute to the stability of the financial system.  
For this reason, we need also to take into account the role of the financial stability which is 
captured by both idiosyncratic and systemic risk measures.  
Focusing on the literature, the most common measure used for the banks’ idiosyncratic risk is 
the Z-score which is considered as the financial stability of an individual bank. It is inversely 
related to the probability of a bank’s insolvency, i.e., the probability that the value of its assets 
becomes lower than the value of the debt.  
Then, besides idiosyncratic risks, the activities of a financial institution can contribute to 
systemic risk (i.e., to the overall financial system). A single institution’s risk measure does not 
necessarily reflect systemic risk, which is the risk that the stability of the financial system as a 
whole is threatened. A measure of systemic risk is the CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011), 
the conditional value at risk of the financial system conditional on institutions being under 
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distress. The difference between the CoVaR conditional on the distress of an institution and the 
CoVaR conditional on the “normal” state of the institution, ∆CoVaR, captures the marginal 
contribution of a particular institution (in a non-causal sense) to the overall systemic risk.  
The existing literature on bank profitability and its impact on financial stability reports mixed 
evidence. From a theoretical model (TengTeng Xu et al., 2019), it is possible to highlight the 
analytical relationship between bank profitability and financial stability by exploring the role 
of non-interest income and bank business models. It is analyzed the importance of the different 
determinants of banking profitability and financial stability, capturing bank business models 
and characteristics, structural and cyclical conditions, and policies.  
In the low interest rate environment following the global financial crisis, banks diversified by 
looking for non interest sources of income. Non-interest income is a mixture of heterogeneous 
components that generate income other than interest income. It comprises fee and commission 
income that is closely related to market oriented activities such as underwriting and 
securitization, but also income that is related to traditional banking activities such as payment 
services fees and commission income arising from the sale of insurances and other products 
(Kohler 2014). This is consistent with the findings by DeYoung and Torna (2013) who show 
that it is not non-interest income per se that is decisive for bank stability, but rather the type of 
non-interest income.  
In this context, the objective of the research question is to stress out the impact that bank specific 
and macroeconomic factors have upon the profitability and the financial stability of the banks 
that operate in Italy. Firstly, applying a panel regression approach in order to examine the 
determinants of bank profitability and financial stability, then evaluating the impact that each 
factor or determinant have upon them.  
Focusing on the case of Italy, the profitability of Italian banks has come under scrutiny in the 
last few years, for at least two reasons. First, in the context of a persistently weak 
macroeconomic environment, rising credit losses, together with the reduction in the 
intermediated funds and the contraction of interest rate spreads, have exerted downward 
pressure on both bank profits and bank capital. Second, because of the Basel III Agreement 
(which imposes tighter capital requirements on banks) the ability of banks to extend credit to 
the economy will depend more than ever on their adequate capitalization. The differences in 
profitability may also be a reflection of their particular business models and its related risks, on 
both the liability and asset side of the balance sheet.  
The main objective of the empirical analysis is to consider a sample of 19 Italian banks, 
considering a period from 2006 to 2019 in order to capture the full effects of the crisis that 
characterized this period.  
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The dependent variables are the bank profitability and financial stability measures, instead the 
independent variables are divided into internal and external determinants, such as the bank 
specific and macroeconomic specific factors.  
Then we test empirically the expected effect of every determinants in order to show the impact 
that internal and external determinants factors have on bank profitability and financial stability.  
The main empirical approach to conduct this type of analysis on bank profitability and financial 
stability is a panel regression setup that control for business models, bank characteristics, as 
well as policy variables and cyclical conditions in the economy.  
The analysis will be made considering three groups of panel regression estimations: the first 
group is characterized by the determinants of bank profitability; instead, in the second one are 
examined determinants of financial stability at individual level through the Z-score measure; 
finally, in the third one are examined determinants of financial stability at system level using 
∆CoVaR measure.  
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides a general overview of the bank 
profitability and financial stability; Chapter 2 presents a focus on the Italian banking system; 
Chapter 3 gives the most relevant contribution of the academic and empiric literature; finally, 



















1. Bank profitability and financial stability  
 
 
1.1. The role of bank profitability 
 
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 quickly turned into a global recession and 
changed the way most financial institutions operate as they had to comply with an economic 
cycle of lower demand, more difficult financing condition, and stricter regulation.  
These structural adjustments in the economy and the reforms of the financial system may have 
had an important effect on banks’ profitability and, consequently, on banks’ capacity to survive 
in the short run. In fact, weak profitability is one of the key challenges currently faced by many 
banks in the European Union. Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the profitability 
of European banks declined substantially, and has not recovered to its pre-crisis level yet.  
In countries facing the sovereign debt crisis banks were hit harder after 2011, as their economies 
deteriorated, while losses peaked in 2008 in countries where banks were more exposed to the 
subprime crisis and to toxic assets. In countries where the recession was particularly severe, 
banks are still paying a high cost of risk in terms of provisioning, and profitability remains weak 
though improving. Therefore, since the profitability of the banking sector is one of the most 
important elements of financial system for the future of the economy, it is important to study 
its determinants in the context of the global financial crisis.  
Profitability is a crucial goal for a firm and can be considered the most important one. Making 
a profit means that a firm is able to generate a stream of revenue that is greater than its operating 
costs, and in broad sense, it signals the success of the firm within the market. 
Over time, several elements contribute to the shape of profitability of a specific business: the 
level of interest rates, inflation, general economic growth, competition within the sector and so 
forth. Moreover profitability is usually pro-cyclical; during economic downturns, the level of 
profits falls sharply, and some firms default, exiting the market for ever.  
The banking sector plays a crucial role within the economy of a country, and it is not surprising 
that its profitability is a strong indicator of the health of a specific economic and financial 
system. In many ways banks represent a fundamental pillar sustaining modern economies, and 
they are active both in direct and in indirect finance.  
Deterioration of the surrounding environment leads to a worse asset quality and lower revenues 
for the banking system. The main problem is that banks are at the same time the target and the 
promoters of the dynamics of the economic cycle. Given that banks represent a transmission 
channel for transferring purchasing power within the economy, their default can be at the same 
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time the effect of defaulting firms and the cause of economic downturns; they can transform a 
crisis started at a microeconomic level into one at macroeconomic level. This is the reason why 
the health of the banking system is a key issue for policymakers and regulators and, at the same 
time, it explains the enormous output of prudential regulation over time.  
As previously explained, the severe crisis that started in the US in mid-2007 has had intense 
and long-lasting effects on the banking sector; one of the most important results of this troubled 
period has been a dramatic fall in bank profitability.  
This outcome is particularly dangerous for the financial industry and for the whole economy, 
in that the resilience of a bank depends on its level of regulatory capital, and its ability to 
increase this aggregate is strongly linked to the remuneration offered to its shareholders. 
Moreover, recent prudential regulation has strengthened the importance of self-financing as a 
measure for reinforcing the level of capital ratio. For this reason, re-establishing a sound level 
of profitability has become a key point of bankers, regulators and policymakers; in this area, 
some elements need to be managed and clarified. On the one hand, from a technical point of 
view, it is necessary to define what we mean by profitability and which indicators we can use 
to measure it. 
Over the years, different ratios have been used to define the profitability level of a specific firm; 
this has been particularly true for the banking system, which has peculiar features in terms of 
financial statements and business lines. These ratios can involve measures of profitability, price 
volatility, risk adjusted performance measures and others linked to financial market data; 
moreover, attention can be focused on the revenues of a specific business, as in the case of the 
interest margin. On the other hand, from a strategic and managerial point of view, it is necessary 
to clarify how the profitability of a specific bank can be enhanced and improved. This involves 
the ability of a firm to understand and anticipate the changes in the surrounding environment, 
choosing between the alternatives available at specific times.  
The European Central Bank (2010) identifies four main drivers that are required to generate 
sustainable profitability defined as the capacity to maintain profits over time: earnings, 
efficiency, risk-taking and leverage, which are discussed below.  
1. The earnings analysis is linked to the asset quality analysis and is an issue which has a 
high degree of attention since the crisis began. In particular, the composition and the 
volatility of earnings are important factors that affect the probability of profits to be 
recurring. For example, if a source of revenues is characterized by high volatility or if 
it is generated by an extraordinary component, it is very unlikely that the profitability 
of a bank in a year will be repeated in the following income statements. That is the 
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reason why analysts investigate bank’s sources of income: they want to understand if 
the performance of a bank is an extraordinary event or if the bank is going to replicate 
it in the future. Moreover, a persistent high level of profitability should alarm about the 
possibility of an excess of risk taking by the bank. In order to analyze the composition 
of profits, analysts look at the main aggregates of the income statement and at their 
relative contribution in generating the global profitability.  
2. Efficiency is about the ability of a bank to generate profits from a group of assets or 
from a source of revenues. In fact, producing revenues is not a synonym of producing 
profits: the main difference is that costs must be deducted from revenues to get profits. 
It is possible to talk about efficiency even relating costs and revenues, such as for the 
cost-to-income ratio: in this case the ratio describes the ability of a bank to transform 
resources into revenues. An important consideration is that the degree of efficiency is 
strictly connected with the business model of a bank since each business model implies 
a different use of resources: this means that efficiency comparisons are meaningful only 
among banks with similar business models.  
3. Risk-taking refers to the amount of risk banks undertake in performing their activities. 
This impacts the profitability of banks in two ways: on one hand, the more the 
undertaken risk, the higher can be the profitability in a good scenario case; on the other 
hand, risk affects profitability due to the adjustments that must be done on earnings 
because of it (like the provisions associated to the credit risk). In this sense, it is 
important that the risk appetite of a bank is aligned with its strategy and its business 
structure not to damage the ability to generate profits in the future. In fact, a bank must 
find a balance in the trade-off between risk, growth and return to be profitable. The most 
used credit-risk indicators are the coverage ratio, the non-performing loans ratio and 
impairment charges as a percentage of total loans.  
4. Leverage is about the use of borrowed capital as a source of funding to increase the 
bank’s assets. The aim is to invest more to generate higher returns on capital, therefore 
boosting some profitability indicators like ROE: in this sense it can be seen as a 
multiplier of performance. But, at the same time, the higher is the leverage of the bank 
and the higher is the solvency risk for the institution, which is the risk not to meet its 
obligations. As reminded by the European Central Bank (2010), leverage should be seen 
as a warning indicator: in particular, when its value increases for more subsequent years 
and when it overcomes a level of 30, the bank is considered “non-sound”.  
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The aim of the European Central Bank (2010) is to point out that to produce a meaningful 
analysis about the profitability of banks it is not enough to look at their income statements and 
at ratios made on it, but there is the need to perform a sum of the part analysis, focusing not 
only to performance depictions but even on profitability drivers.  
This new scheme of analysis is a consequence produced by the recent crisis, which has 
completely changed the way analysts investigate the profitability of banks. Today, the focus is 
not merely on the short-term performance, but it includes even a complementary analysis on 
risk, assets quality, capital adequacy and leverage.  
The aim is to analyze key business drivers to understand whether the business model adopted 
by banks is producing a sustainable profitability, which means that banks will be able to 
maintain their performance in the long term and that they will be able to absorb unexpected 
losses due to shocks in the future.  
The importance of bank profitability can be evaluated at the micro and macro levels of the 
economy. At the micro level, profit is the essential prerequisite of a competitive banking 
institution and the cheapest source of funds. The basic aim of a bank’s management is to achieve 
a profit, as the essential requirement for conducting any business. At the macro level, a 
profitable banking sector is better able to withstand negative shocks and contribute to the 
stability of the financial system.  
1.1.1. Measures of bank profitability  
Profitability can be defined as the ability to produce a positive balance between the revenues 
and costs of an economic entity, being this a whole enterprise or part of it, through the use of 
financial and non-financial resources. This means, first of all, that the measurement of bank 
profitability normally consists in a ratio in which the numerator contains items extracted from 
the income statement, while the denominator comprises items typically linked to assets or 
liabilities included in the balance sheet. The specific choice of the items that will be included 
in the calculation determines the wide range of indices available for analysis. However, there 
are some properties, listed below, that appear particularly desirable when choosing a 
profitability metric: 
§ The first characteristic should be consistency with the purpose for which the index was 
constructed. In particular, the quantities taken into account should effectively represent 
the analyst’s area of interest; appropriate reclassifications in financial statements should 
make it possible to isolate those items that refer to similar activities performed by the 
bank, allowing a correct measurement of performance; 
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§ A second and fundamental characteristic should be data reliability: this involves some 
important considerations on the subject of data quality. This aspect of data is strongly 
linked to a third virtuous element that should always be sought: data consistency; 
§ Considering data consistency, the existence of multiple methodologies for calculating 
the financial statement indices and the evolution over time of accounting principles and 
supervisory regulations make comparison between banks from different geographical 
contexts (a typical example is a comparison of European and U.S. banks) or the 
reconstruction of adequate historical series of data extremely complex.  
For this reason, it is clear that the creation and use of bank profitability metrics requires a 
common framework of accounting rules and homogeneous practices in the calculation of the 
indices.  
Alongside the three properties mentioned above, we would like to draw attention to two further 
elements in order to increase the effectiveness of profitability measures in explaining the 
performance of a bank: these are elements that could be defined as “enhancers” of the above 
properties. The first element is transparency, meaning the possibility of clearly identifying and 
breaking down determinants of profitability. The second one comprises the replicability of the 
result; the greater the information content of a given profitability datum, the greater the 
persistence of profits. This aspect is of fundamental importance in the analysis of bank 
profitability, being linked to the bank’s ability to increase its equity over time, attract new 
capital and reduce its overall risk.  
From these considerations it is clear how complex it is to have effective measures of 
profitability; each usable metric has strengths and weaknesses that must be taken into account 
when interpreting the financial performance of a bank. The bank profitability measures 
commonly used are generally traceable on two main indices. In most cases, the key variables 
are the return on equity (ROE) and the return on assets (ROA). Moreover, another indicator 
may be added, that is the net interest margin (NIM).  
Over time, volatility measures for these indicators (generally in the form of standard deviation) 
and risk-return variables have also been established; examples of these latter ratios are the 
RAROA and RAROE, respectively, obtained by dividing the ROA and ROE by their volatility 
over time. These are interesting extensions to bank profitability analysis, since, as stated 
previously, persistence is a fundamental element for the evaluation of the overall performance 
achieved by a company. Below, all these profitability measures are analyzed in detail, in an 
attempt to highlight their reporting content, areas of use and critical aspects.  
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i. Return on Equity (ROE): It is an indicator that is easy to construct and use, its 
financial significance is extremely simple to understand and it is available for all public 
companies. For this reason, it is not surprising that in the bank profitability literature, 
ROE has been used as a dependent variable in most quantitative studies. ROE is 
generally calculated as the ratio between net income and owners’ equity at the end of a 
certain period of observation. The latter usually tends to coincide with the end of the 
calendar year, unless the drawing up of financial statements requires different choices. 
The importance that this indicator has acquired over time derives from the significance 
that can be attributed to it: the ROE expresses the percentage of remuneration obtained 
by shareholders through net profits recorded in the company’s income statement. This 
is a fundamental information for the shareholders in that they can compare this result 
with the profitability offered by other instruments or the stock market as a whole, 
verifying if the risk-return profile of their investment meets their expectations. This 
aspect is particularly useful when determining whether the company is creating or 
destroying value, for example, by comparing its ability to generate a level of 
profitability sufficient to cover its weighted average cost of capital or, more simply, its 
expected cost of equity. However, as stated previously, this parameter has numerous 
weak points which must be taken into consideration. The first is a feature common to 
almost all financial indices and derives from the possibility of having different ways of 
calculating a certain parameter. For example, from a financial and interpretative point 
of view, the index calculated on the average of the owners’ capital appears more correct; 
in fact, if a tangible change in the shareholders’ equity occurred during the year, a 
denominator formed only from the stock at the end of the period risks providing biased 
results. This feature has a financial significance: using the average of owners’ equity 
enables one to account for the fact that the production of net profits occurred during the 
year, thanks to certain average capital endowment. Obviously, this assumption presents 
potential defects too. The average of the balances at the beginning and at the end of the 
year implies that it is assumed that the change observed in shareholders’ equity occurred 
proportionally throughout the year; if instead it happened near at the beginning or the 
end, the calculation would provide biased results. Continuing the analysis of the 
weakness of the ROE, we can see that there is another highly critical aspect of this index, 
which derives from the information used to construct the indicator: the company’s 
operational sensitivity to financial leverage. This is a delicate problem in the light of the 
effects that the correlation between the two variables can produce on interpretations of 
the ROE data provided by a company. Indeed, all else being equal, a company with less 
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owners’ equity will have a higher ROE. Since this index is so widespread and 
appreciated, this could push managers to choose more leveraged financial structures in 
order to increase the perception of profitability of their companies. This aspect is well 
known in the financial and banking field in particular; the international financial crisis 
that began in 2007 clearly highlighted both the extreme level of leverage with which 
some financial intermediaries operated, and the risks that this strategy involves. 
Increased leverage weakens the financial structure of a bank, making it more vulnerable 
and less resilient to losses. It could be argued that the increase in ROE as leverage 
increases represent a compensation (through greater profitability) for the greater risk 
incurred by shareholders; however, in the absence of an adequate perception of this 
growing risk, the increase in ROE would be seen as the result of better business 
management. This explains the fact that the prudential regulation has imposed precise 
and more stringent limits on leverage in the banking sector due to episodes of instability 
that affected many banks during the crisis.  
ii. Return on assets (ROA): it is the second most used performance measure in the 
banking sector; in the literature it is extremely common to find both measures as 
dependent variables in econometric estimations or in financial analysts’ reports. In 
particular, ROA is used together with ROE to verify differences in the behavior of 
covariates when the dependent variable varies, or as an alternative to ROE in empirical 
model robustness checks. In the financial world, ROA is widely used, thanks to the ease 
with which it is possible to interpret its results: it permits measurement of the return 
generated by a company’s assets. This is because the indicator is constructed by relating 
the bank’s net income to its total assets. As in the previous case, some indexes are 
constructed by putting the average of total assets at the beginning and at the end of the 
observation period in the denominator, rather than the final value obtained from the 
balance sheet; in these cases, we talk of ROAA, or return on average assets. One of the 
main limitations of ROA is linked to an accounting aspect of this financial parameter: 
if a bank has significant amounts of off-balance-sheet activities, the ROA tends to 
provide biased results, that is, to lose real financial significance.  
Summarizing the differences between these performance indicators, it can be affirmed 
that while ROE focuses on the return generated for shareholders, ROA expresses the 
result obtained from the use of the company’s assets, regardless of the way in which 
they were financed. From this point of view, the use of ROA is particularly interesting, 
since it shifts attention on the one hand into the managerial choices behind the 
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composition of the assets, and on the other into the profitability of the latter. This aspect 
is linked to some key strategic choices for a bank, such as the identification of its 
business model and risk appetite.  
iii. Net interest margin (NIM): it represents the third and final “classical” measure by 
which bank profitability is assessed. This indicator explains the capacity of the bank to 
produce the margin and the return obtained through traditional intermediation activity, 
that is, borrowing and lending money. More specifically, the indicator is usually 
constructed dividing net interest income by interest-earning assets; net interest income 
is, in turn, calculated as the difference between interest income (derived from the bank-
lending activity) and interest expenses (paid to those who lend to the bank, such as 
account holders). For this indicator too, there is a formulation (which is also the most 
frequent in the literature) which provides for the inclusion in the denominator of the 
average interest-earning assets as the average of the data collected at the beginning and 
at the end of the observation period. Compared to the performance indicators mentioned 
above, NIM stands out for one fundamental reason: it takes into account only the 
revenues and costs incurred for the traditional activity of commercial banks, ignoring 
other forms of cost and revenue. This may appear to be an element of weakness in the 
index, due to the neglect of many entries deriving from the bank’s income statement; in 
fact, this focus on a few, but very significant budget items, allows us to examine the 
profitability of the bank’s core business (at least for commercial banks) in greater depth. 
The NIM numerator, or net interest income, is one of the main items contributing to the 
net income of a bank (and therefore also influences the performance of other indices, 
such as ROE and ROA). NIM has grown in importance in the analysis of bank 
profitability following the great financial crisis. After 2007, bank credit portfolios began 
to show signs of sharp deterioration; non-performing loans (NPLs) grew enormously, 
penalizing banks that operated with riskier customers and with a high share of loans 
over total assets. Small local banks focusing on traditional borrowing and lending 
activities have been strongly affected by these dynamics, but large international groups 
have also experienced critical issues. The monetary authorities’ response to the rapid 
spread of the crisis in the economic system has involved various policies, but an 
extremely evident aspect has been the general lowering of short term interest rates. In 
the more developed countries, this has been accompanied by a strong decrease in long 
term rates, leading to a flattening of the yield curve. These two elements, of micro and 
macroeconomic nature (the formation of NPLs and the drastic lowering of rates of 
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return), have an impact on NIM: they are able to influence both the denominator and 
numerator of the index. The evolution of the net interest margin therefore has the role 
of showing how banks can adapt their assets and liabilities management following a 
change in the surrounding economic context, and hence the interest in this performance 
indicator in turbulent years such as those following 2007. Alongside these undoubted 
qualities, NIM also naturally has some limitations. As previously stated, the first derives 
from its nature; focusing only on net interest income, the index neglects other potential 
important business areas that the bank may decide to enter. A second critical aspect 
regards the inability of the net interest margin to disentangle the importance of interest 
income and interest costs in the calculation of the net interest income. An increase in 
the NIM numerator could, in fact, derive from greater asset profitability of from cheaper 
funding sources; both situations have specific risk factors. An increase in interest 
income could signal credit concession to riskier customers, willing to pay higher interest 
rates against their own risk of insolvency. Likewise, a reduction in the rate of interest 
on savings could weaken customer loyalty, leading to cash outflows to the benefit of 
competitors or other uses by customers.  
iv. Risk – adjusted measures: over the years, academics and practitioners have created 
a wide range of risk adjusted return measures, with the aim of providing a clearer view 
of the link between positive financial performance and risks borne to achieve this result. 
The literature on the topic has focused on some particularly significant and widespread 
indicators: RAROE and RAROA (respectively, risk adjusted ROE and ROA). In 
general, the main risk adjusted return measures are based on well-known risk metrics; 
of these, the most commonly used is the standard deviation. This statistical measure is 
largely used in modern finance, thanks to its simplicity of calculation and interpretation. 
It expresses the degree of volatility of a certain phenomenon, and therefore represents 
the classic degree of risk of an investment in the collective imagination. Standard 
deviation underlies two indices widely used in the literature: RAROE and RAROA. 










where sROE and sROA, respectively, identify the calculated standard deviation for 
ROE and ROA over the reference period, which requires some clarification. As always 
occurs when calculating a single-point figure starting from numerical series, it is 
necessary to first define the period on which the analysis is carried out; this depends 
simultaneously on the availability of data and the time span of interest. From an 
interpretative point of view, the measures indicated above have the same characteristics 
as the metrics from which they derive, that is, ROE and ROA; they do, however, permit 
the penalizing of subjects with a high dispersion of financial results. When observing 
RAROE and RAROA data, it is therefore good practice to analyze in detail the 
profitability and profit volatility data that contributed to the calculation; in this way, a 
much clearer and more reliable view will be achieved. 
1.1.2. Internal and external determinants 
In this paragraph, we analyze the factors that explain bank profitability according to causal links 
widely explored in the literature. There are many variables that have proved capable of 
explaining the dynamics of income produced by a bank. To try to simplify the analysis and 
make the contents more usable, it is important to firstly divide the main determinants of bank 
profitability into internal and external factors. 
§ Internal determinants of bank profitability: this large group of factors, 
extensively studied in empirical research that have tested over time their ability to affect 
the performance of banks, often finding conflicting results.  
One of the most carefully explored factors among the determinants of bank profitability 
is the size of the bank. It is a factor that has multiple effects on the performance of a 
bank; from one point of view, it is linked to the possible creation of economies of scale, 
while, on the other, large size can have specific connotations for some subjects (e.g. the 
so called “too big to fail” banks (SIFIs)), and condition their behavior and economic 
results. In the literature, size is a control variable present in almost all empirical work; 
its importance in discriminating small and large subjects is fundamental, above all, 
where the size range of the investigated samples is wide.  
The results of empirical estimation models concerning the role of size in influencing 
bank profitability provide contrasting results. The existence of economies of scale in 
banking business is not proven incontrovertibly; in general, the indications deriving 
from data analysis seem to suggest that the advantages linked to the size decrease as the 
size increases. This result should not be surprising: an increase in size can generate some 
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beneficial scale effects, but at the same time it generates organizational diseconomies 
and various forms of inefficiency linked to the great dimension itself. When the negative 
effects outweigh the positives, an increase in size becomes a negative factor for bank’s 
profitability. However, contrary situations may occur, in which small entities can 
exploit competitive advantages, generating high and stable levels of profitability.  
In this way, it is possible to highlight that the size may often represent a significant 
element in explaining a pattern of bank profitability; the sign of the link, however, is 
not certain a priori.  
A second internal factor is the business model chosen by the bank. This element 
radically affects the strategic positioning of the company and its risk-return profile. A 
lot of research effort concentrated on this aspect in the period immediately following 
the great international financial crisis; this indirectly demonstrates the importance 
attributed to the choice of business model in explaining banks’ income profile.  
The determination of a bank’s orientation toward a certain business model can be carried 
out directly through specific dummies, where the strategic choice made by management 
is declared, or through variables that tend to capture specific and significant 
connotations of the bank’s activity.  
In this way, two variables can be derived from, respectively, the balance sheet and the 
income statement of an intermediary: the share of loans out of total assets and the non-
interest income. The share of the credit portfolio out of a bank’s total assets denotes its 
orientation toward the traditional activity of borrowing and lending money. Then for 
the second variable, as highlighted previously, an important aggregate that plays a 
crucial role on the analysis of bank profitability is the non-interest income. It is a 
mixture of heterogenous components that generate income other than interest income. 
It comprises fee and commission income that is closely related to market-oriented 
activities such as underwriting and securitization, but also income arising from the sale 
of insurance and other products.  
Non-interest income also includes the income that banks generate with their trading and 
market making activities and other operating income. Since non-interest income is 
usually more volatile than interest income, it is often held to be riskier (Kohler 2014). 
This is consistent with the findings by DeYoung and Torna (2013) who show that it is 
not non-interest income per se that is decisive for bank stability, but rather the type of 
non-interest income. In fact, in addition to the traditional lending and deposit-taking 
activities, banks perform many other activities like checking and cash management, 
investment services and securities brokerage. Knowing that concentration of revenues 
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on a single source of income exposes one to significant risks if an adverse scenario 
emerges (e.g. a serious economic crisis that makes the recovery of loans granted 
difficult, due to widespread default among customers), many banks may prefer to 
diversify revenue sources.  
The ability to activate effective revenue diversification processes is linked to a bank’s 
ability to bear the costs related to the implementation of organizational processes, 
technological investments and the acquisition of skills for personnel assigned to new 
functions. It is clear that these dynamics require adequate adaption time for the bank; in 
fact, it does not seem possible to follow diversification strategies over a very short 
period. The cost to be paid can be high and the volatility generated by new sources of 
revenue may be greater than the beneficial effect of diversification deriving from the 
low correlation between the various activities carried out, leading to a loss for the bank. 
This is the so called “dark side of revenue diversification” introduced in a famous article 
by Stiroh and Rumble (2006).  
While on the subject of loans and non-interest income, the role played by possible credit 
deterioration must be taken into account; this is an aspect that emerged with great 
emphasis at the outbreak of the international financial crisis.  
The variables used in the literature in this regard are varied, and range from the share of 
non-performing loans out of total loans, troubled loans out of total loans or the level of 
loan loss provisions inserted by the bank in its income statement. As a rule, all these 
aspects have provided strong empirical evidence in explaining the dynamics of bank 
profitability; the expected sign of the coefficients associated with these variables is 
naturally negative (Foos et al., 2010).  
Another crucial aspect that the severe crisis has highlighted is the importance of the 
bank’s regulatory capital level; as previously mentioned, the low level of many 
intermediaries’ equity in the past allowed them to generate extremely high levels of 
ROE. However, the crash of the crisis evidenced the fragility of intermediaries 
characterized by excessively high level of leverage, and prudential regulation 
intervened to limit those speculative strategies. 
Financial leverage (or capital ratio) has therefore become particularly important 
explanatory variables in the field of empirical research. Financially, a lower degree of 
financial leverage should be accompanied by a lower risk of default for the bank, and 
therefore its greater resilience even in the face of market turbulence.  
Finally, a key variable widely used in the literature is the cost income ratio, calculated 
as the ratio between operating costs and operating revenues; it is a particularly 
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informative indicator, since it throws light on whether a bank is able to balance recurring 
costs and revenues. Although there are entities able to operate with extremely low fixed 
costs, thanks to their structure (e.g. online banks or banks that operate through tied agent 
networks), as a rule, banks that carry out traditional activities and manage to reach a 
low cost income ratio tend to perform better than others.  
This is a variable that management itself should monitor with great care, partly in order 
to conduct effective benchmarking activities as regards competitors. It should be noted 
in this regard that the importance of the cost income ratio lies in its ability to compare 
costs and revenues, and not merely provide a representation of the costs incurred. In 
other words, a limited cost income ratio can be achieved both through a reduction in 
cost and an increase in revenues; it is the relationship between the two which is really 
significant. It follows that a policy of mere cost-cutting could prove to be completely 
mistaken where the reduction in charges leads to customer dissatisfaction with the 
service received, with consequent lower revenues in the future. The cost income ratio 
could even be reduced by increasing costs, offset, however, by proportionally higher 
revenues; it is undoubtedly one of the main indicators for understanding the ability of 
management to make virtuous choices for the bank’s future.  
§ External determinants of bank profitability: banks are crucial for the functioning 
of financial markets, but also for the economy as a whole; their nature as asset and risk 
transformers means they play a leading role in intermediation activities.  
This results in a very close link between the life of a bank and the environment in which 
it operates; it is therefore normal that there is a very strong relationship between 
environmental factors and bank profitability.  
In the literature, the external determinants of bank profitability are generally 
characterized by macroeconomic factors. Of these ones, the elements that appear to be 
most able to influence bank profitability are the economic cycle, the level of market 
interest rates and inflation.  
The economic cycle is normally approximated through variations in gross domestic 
product (GDP); specifically, bank profitability is expected to follow a pro-cyclical trend 
(Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009). GDP growth should therefore stimulate banks’ 
revenues, while the onset of recession leads to a reduction in income. GDP performance 
tends to summarize all the surrounding economic conditions, and therefore the profit 
opportunities for companies operating on the market. Interest rate and inflation rate 
trends are other elements used frequently as control variable for the financial conditions 
of the economy.  
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To conclude, it should be clear that defining and measuring bank profitability is particularly 
complex and involves selecting appropriately from a huge number of financial indices. This 
implies that the profitability of banks is not only affected by how the banking activities are 
managed, but it depends even on some macroeconomic factors, which are affected by economic 
institutions and by the regulator.  
At the same time profitability depends even on well identified drivers, which must be carefully 
analyzed with the business model of the bank to assess whether the return obtained by the 
financial institution is sustainable, which means that it was generated by recurring components 
and so that it is replicable in the future.  
 
1.2. The role of financial stability  
 
According to the existing literature on financial stability issues it has become apparent that in 
recent years the questions related to the maintaining of financial stability have been receiving 
priority attention from both academics and policy makers around the world.  
Clearly the definition of “financial stability” is important for the development of relevant 
analytical tools and for the design of policy and operational frameworks essential for economic 
policy implementation.  
The financial stability generally refers to the stability of the financial system as a whole, and as 
a consequence to the financial strength of an individual institution. In fact, the stability of 
financial institutions and markets represents a prerequisite for a stable financial system, which 
in this way is intended as a shock absorber. Thereby, in order to assess the financial stability, 
the relations and networks among financial institutions is equally important.  
In particular, the recent financial crisis has painfully disclosed the policy mismatch between the 
former regulatory framework of banking supervision, namely Basel II, and its intended 
objective of financial stability.  
The existing deficiencies predominantly concern neglected dimensions of systemic risk as well 
as their corresponding transmission channels. Accordingly, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) has aimed to approach the mentioned issues with Basel III, the latest 
version of its global regulatory framework on banking supervision. To fill existing gaps, the 
framework passed through the indispensable development process towards a broader 
consideration of dimensions of systemic risk. The Basel III accord reacts to the events of the 
recent financial turmoil with a combination of revised micro-prudential and macro-prudential 
regulatory instruments in order to address various newly identified dimensions of systemic risk. 
But the theoretical and empirical literature was mainly focused on the dimension of individual 
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bank risk and one main measure of individual soundness was commonly used to analyse the 
impact of financial mutations and market structure on financial stability: the Z-score.  
However, the recent financial crisis questioned the exogeneity assumption of banking risks. 
Thus, the sum of the risks borne by financial institutions does not reflect the risks borne by the 
entire system. This would be due to common exposures to a single risk factor, the pro-
cyclicality of the financial imbalances and the interconnections between financial institutions 
characterized by their complexity. The latter does not exclusively relate to the importance of 
their size but also to the sophistication of their instruments, threatening the substitutability of 
their products.  
Prior to the global financial downturns, the regulatory framework in place was only based on a 
micro-prudential foundation. The crisis highlighted its shortcomings through the pro-cyclicality 
and the handling of solvency ratios, as well as the lack of macro-prudential dimension. The 
implementation of a micro-prudential risk assessment based on a general equilibrium and 
designed to safeguard the financial system as a whole appeared unavoidable to complete the 
micro-prudential risk assessment based on a partial equilibrium in its conception, and aiming 
at preventing costly failures of individual financial institutions.  
The endogenous nature of risk introduced the need for a macro-prudential approach to bank 
regulation, giving a key role to banking regulators in the computing and management of global 
risk, so called systemic risk.  
For our purpose, in defining financial stability we are concerned both of an individual bank risk 
and systemic risk (i.e. to the overall financial system) in order to make a more exhaustive 
analysis. As indicated in Figure 1, risks and vulnerabilities may develop endogenously, within 
the financial system, as well as exogenously – for example, in the real economy.  
Different kinds of risks require different policy actions. The size and likelihood of endogenous 
imbalances can typically be influenced by the financial authorities through regulation, 
supervision, or crisis management. By contrast, external disturbances are harder to control, 
except through macroeconomic policies subject to long and uncertain time lags. The scope for 
policy in the event of an external disturbance is limited mostly to reducing the impact on the 
financial system, for instance, by maintaining the system’s ability to absorb shocks and 






1.2.1. Measures of financial stability and its determinants 
 
The use of both individual and systemic risk measures must not be viewed as a discrepancy 
because the two indicators do not share the same dimension.  
Developments in financial stability cannot be summarized in a single quantitative indicator.  
In contrast with price stability for instance, there is as yet no unequivocal unit of measurement 
for financial stability. This reflects the multifaced nature of financial stability as it relates to 
both the stability and resilience of financial institutions, and to the smooth functioning of 
financial markets and settlements systems. Moreover, different factors need to be weighed in 
terms of their potential ultimate influence on real economic activity.  
For a deeper analysis is better to distinguish between systemic and idiosyncratic risk measure, 
as follows:  
 
I. Systemic risk measure: 
According to the European Central Bank (2010)1, systemic risk can be defined as the risk of 
financial instability insofar it adversely affects the effective functioning of the financial system, 
and it significantly impairs the sustainable growth of the economy and social welfare.  
 
1 Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, at the 13th conference of the ECB-CFS Research 
Network, Frankfurt am Main, 27 September 2010.  
Source: International Monetary Fund, 2005 
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Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007, and the dramatic effects of the Lehman 
collapse in 2008, systemic risk has become a matter of great concern for policy makers and 
central bankers. Losses tend to spread across financial institutions, threatening the financial 
system as a whole.  
The spreading of distress gives rise to systemic risk, the risk that the intermediation capacity of 
the entire financial system is impaired, with potentially adverse consequences for the supply of 
credit to the real economy.  
In systemic financial events, spillovers across institutions can arise from direct contractual links 
and heightened counterparty credit risk, or can occur indirectly through price effects and 
liquidity spirals.  
The most common measure of risk used by financial institutions is the value at risk (VaR), but 
it focuses only on the risk of an institution in isolation. However, a single institution’s risk 
measure does not necessarily reflect the systemic risk.  
First, according to the classification in Brunnermeier, Crocket, Goodhart, Perssaud, and Shin 
(2009), a systemic risk measure should identify the risk to the system by “individually 
systemic” institutions, which are so interconnected and large that they can cause negative risk 
spillover effects on others. Second, risk measures should recognize that risk typically builds up 
in the background in the form of imbalances and bubbles and materializes only during a crisis.  
To emphasize the systemic nature of the risk measure, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) add to 
existing risk measures the prefix “Co”, which stands for conditional, contagion, or 
comovement. Focusing primarily on CoVaR, where institutions i’s CoVaR relative to the 
system is defined as the VaR of the whole financial sector conditional on institution i being in 
distress. The difference between the CoVaR conditional on the distress of an institution and the 
CoVaR conditional on the “normal” state of the institution, ∆CoVaR, captures the marginal 
contribution of a particular institution to the overall systemic risk.  
There are several advantages to the ∆CoVaR measure. First, while this measure has the ability 
to highlight the contribution of each institution to overall system risk, traditional risk measures 
focus on the risk of individual institutions. Another, important advantage of this measure is that 
it is general enough to study the risk spillovers from institutions across the whole financial 
network.  
 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) denote by "#$%&!
"|$ the VaR of institution j (or of the financial 
system) conditional on some event "(.$) of institution i. That is, "#$%&!
"|$  is implicitly 





3"(.$)) = 4 
 
II. Idiosyncratic risk measures: 
In this part, we explain three idiosyncratic risk measures that are commonly used in the 
empirical research in order to assess the bank financial stability at individual level. There are 
briefly analyzed, respectively: Z-score, Expected Default Frequency (EDF) and finally the 
Value at Risk (VaR). 
 
§ Z-score: in line with the literature (e.g. Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006), one of 
the main indicators of bank is the Z-score, which is defined as, 
 





where CAR is equal to the bank’s capital asset ratio (i.e. the ratio between equity and 
total assets) and SDROA is equal to the standard deviation of the ROA. The index is 
clearly characterized by the numerator, which contains the solvency condition of the 
bank. Indeed, as a rule, insolvency occurs when the sum of "'& and &(' is null or 
negative; a high level of capitalization is therefore necessary to counteract negative &(' 
results. The volatility of &(', seen in the index denominator, penalizes companies that 
have shown an unstable pattern of financial results over time.  
The Z-score is the inverse of the probability of insolvency, i.e. a higher Z-score indicates 
that a bank incurs fewer risks and is more stable.  
Its widespread use is due to its relative simplicity and the fact that it can be calculated 
using only accounting information. This wording shows that the Z-score combines in 
one single indicator the bank profitability, bank capital and return volatility.  
From a statistical point of view, the Z-score indicates the critical threshold of standard 
deviations below which the collapse of bank returns wipes out all equity and led to bank 
insolvency. From an economic viewpoint, the Z-score measures the probability that a 
bank becomes insolvent due to a decline in its assets value below its debt value.  
 
§ Expected Default Frequency (EDF): it is a credit measure that was developed by 
Moody’s Analytics as part of the KMV model.  
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EDF measures the probability that a company will default on payments within a given 
period by failing to honor the interest and principal payments, usually within a period 
of one year, hence, it provides a forward-looking measure of default.  
 
§ Value at Risk (VaR): this has for many years been the standard measure used for risk 
management.  
VaR is the methodology used to estimate the market risk to which a bank is exposed, 
and also for determining, the banks’ minimum capital required to cover this risk.  
It measures the probable maximum loss registered on a certain position or a positions’ 
portfolio in a given period and for a given confidence interval.  
There are different models to estimate the VaR of a portfolio or return distribution, 
either parametrically or non-parametrically that are briefly explained below: 
 
o Variance-covariance method: made popular by JP Morgan at the start of the ‘90s, 
it is one of the fastest and easiest method to estimate the VaR.  
It relies on the fact that only risk factor of a portfolio is the value of the factors 
contained in the portfolio itself. It is based on two fundamental assumptions: 
§ The distribution of returns of the risk factors is a normal distribution; 
§ The movements in the portfolio’s value is a linear combination of the 
movements of the securities that make it up. This implies that the 
movements in the value of the portfolio are also distributed according 
to a normal distribution.  
Hence, once estimated the correlation matrix of returns between the securities from 
the historical series of the  risk factors, given the properties of the normal distribution 
it is easy to obtain the desired percentile of the distribution of the movements of the 
expected values of the portfolio.  
o Monte Carlo method: a simulation technique that, given some assumptions on the 
distribution of returns and their correlation, forecasts a series of different sets of 
possible future values of the securities in a portfolio. For each set of values, the 
portfolio is then re-evaluated and from the vector of expected returns the desired 
percentile is extracted.  
o Historical Simulation method: this approach uses historical data of returns to 
generate an empirical distribution. It then assumes that the empirical distribution can 
be used as a prediction for future returns.  
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It is considered one of the best approaches both because it does not involve any a 
priori hypothesis on the distribution of returns and because the correlation between 
risk factors is implicitly captured without the need of an ad hoc estimation. Almost 
85% of large banks in the world were using historical simulation while the remaining 
part Monte Carlo simulations.  
 
In most empirical research, the commonly dependent variable that is used for the evaluation of 
financial stability is the Z-score since it is pretty easy to determine through the balance sheet 
information.  
But in order to make a more complete analysis, is crucial to take into account as dependent 
variable, also the component of systemic risk. As we have already seen, ∆CoVaR has the ability 
to capture the financial stability at system level and to assess the risk that the stability of the 
financial system as a whole is threatened.  
 
As mentioned earlier, financial stability is measured both by idiosyncratic and systemic risks. 
Now, we summarize the factors that explain financial stability dividing the variables into 
internal and external variables (as we have already made for the analysis of bank profitability). 
Key-bank specific variables include bank profitability, asset size, funding risk, income 
diversification and credit risk.   
In addition to these factors, we need to consider also the external determinants, where are 
considered policy and cyclical variables such as: short term interest rates, government structural 












1.3. The interconnections between bank profitability and financial 
stability: a stylized theoretical model 
 
 
Building on the research and model made by TengTeng Xu et al., (2019), we analyse the 
analytical relationship between bank profitability and financial stability. The focus of the model 
is to capture both retailed-based and market-based non-interest income activities, and, as a 
consequence, the non-linear impact of NII on banking risks. To keep it tractable and focused, 
they abstract from modelling a dynamic programming problem, as it is not essential for 
capturing the stylized relationship among bank profitability, business models and financial 
stability.   
 
First of all, we need to consider the model set up with a static setting of a representative risk-








In this way, the balance sheet constraint is given by the following equation: 
 
? + @, + @- = = + )	 ≡ 	', 
 
where Nm  stands for the assets related to market-based NII activities, such as underwriting, 
trade commissions, and investment-banking services, and Nr captures retail-based NII 
activities, such as payment services fees, insurance commissions, lending service fees, and 
fiduciary income. Nr and Nm are the assets devoted to NII activities at the beginning of the 
period.2 L stands for loans, D deposits, E equity, and A bank assets. For simplicity, D, L and E 
are assumed to be exogenous, and that the capital constraint is binding, E = eA, where e is the 




2 For example, if retail-based NII includes payment service fees, then Nr  represents the payment network or 
system’s assets (e.g., ATM, software, machinery).  
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Going on, we need to write the bank’s profit function, that is given by: 
 
ΠC = (1 − E)9̃.? + 9̃-@- + 9̃,@,
/?01/ − 8-@- − 8,@, − 82' − 93=, 
 
where tilde “  ̃ ” stands for random variables, and returns are normally distributed. Then, cm, cr 
and cf  are the cost parameters, x denotes the problem loan ratio and the deposit rate rD can be 
viewed as funding cost in this model. Particularly important in the model is the Cobb-Douglas 
production function @,/?01/ of retail-based NII activities. It ensures homogeneity of degree 
one with respect to inputs L and Nr, as well as the complementarity between retail-based lending 
business L, and retail-based NII activities Nr.  
After having introduced the bank’s profit function, it is possible to consider the bank’s objective 
function that is given by, 
H%E4",4# )(Π
C) + ) 
subject to the balance constraint  ? + @9 + @H = = + ). The bank’s survival probability is 
given by 4 = I9#J(ΠC + ) ≥ 0). Then, it is possible to normalize the bank’s objective function 
by bank asset A and take expectations. In this way, the normalized objective function can be 
rewritten as, 
H%E6",6# M7 + : 
 





&' = (1 − -)/"0 + /#2# + /$2$%0&'% − 3#2# − 3$2$ − 3( − /)(1 − 4), 
 
4 = #( , 0 =
6
( , 2# =
7#




Pay attention that nm  and nr capture market-based and retail-based NII intensity (share of NII 
activities in bank asset, different from income), l is the LTA ratio, and M7 captures the expected 
return on asset (ROA).  
 
Now, since we are interested in the relationship between bank profitability and financial 
stability, for this model two types of risks that are particularly relevant for financial stability 
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considerations are described. First, we evaluate the default probability of a bank, measured by 
its overall credit risk or solvency. Second, we are also interested in the tail risks faced by a 
bank. Based on this stylized theoretical model, it is possible to define the EDF proxy (default 
probability) and the VaR of individual banks in this way: 
  
§ Expected Default Frequency Proxy (EDF) is defined as one minus the survival 
probability of the bank: 
 
)=P ≡ 1 − 4 = I9#J(QR + : < 0) 
 
§ Value at Risk (VaR) is defined as the 95 percentile of equity loss in this model, where 
higher VaR signifies higher tail risks: 
 
I9#J(|?#77| ≥ $%&) = I9#J(−QR − : ≥ $%&) = 0.05. 
 
Solving the bank’s optimization problem by taking first order conditions with respect to nm and 
nr, subject to its budget constraint, we obtain these results: 
 
[O-]:				9- = 8- + Z			[\	O- > 0 
[O,]:				^9,O,
/10N01/ = 8, + Z			[\	O- > 0 
 
where Z is the Lagrange multiplier of  N + O, + O- = 1. 
 
Then, the authors rewrite the first order conditions with subscript * denoting the optimal value 















∗ = `N, 			O-






1 − N − `N
 
 
If N < 0
09:
 ,the first order conditions imply an interior solution where the optimal retail-based 
NII intensity O,∗  is a positive function of the LTA ratio l, reflecting the complementarity 
between O, and l. If instead, N ≥
0
09:
 , the first order conditions imply a corner solution where 
the optimal market-based NII intensity O-∗  is equal to zero.  
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Based on the model solutions are derived five important propositions that highlights the nexus 
between bank profitability and financial stability: 
 
¨ Proposition 1: Bank idiosyncratic risks measured by EDF and VaR are decreasing in 
the (expected) ROA M7






∗ < 0 
 
The economic intuition that explains the negative relationship between idiosyncratic 
risks and bank profitability is that per-period profit M7∗  provides a buffer against negative 
shocks to bank capital. Higher values of M7∗  means larger buffers and reduced default 
risk, which lowers idiosyncratic risks. 
 
¨ Proposition 2: When LTA ratio (l) is below a certain threshold (N), higher NII share (s) 







> 0,					[\	N ≤ N 
 
To understand the underlying mechanism, note that bank assets make a portfolio 
consisting of three sources of return: loans, market-based NII activities, and retail-based 
NII activities. If l is small enough (N ≤ N), O,∗ O-∗⁄  will also be sufficiently low that banks 
become over-reliant on market-based NII activities. If the bank’s portfolio weighs 
heavily on one source of return (i.e., O,∗ O-∗⁄  is very small), the overall portfolio risks 
increase. 
 
¨ Proposition 3: Expected profits are decreasing in the problem loan ratio x, the 















This proposition is consistent with the accounting relationship in a bank’s balance sheet. 
Intuitively, higher problem loan ratios could led to more provisioning for non-
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performing loans (NPLs), which would then weigh on bank profitability. In addition, 
higher costs either from the operating side or the funding side would reduce bank profits.  
 
1.3.1. Extension of the model with bank charter value  
 
In this part of the analysis, it is made an extension with bank charter value, in order to determine 
the last two propositions. In addition to the book value of profitability, another common 
measure of profitability is the price-to-book ratio, which can be interpreted as the charter value 
of a bank, or a function of all future profits. The baseline model is extended to include the 
interaction of bank charter value and idiosyncratic risks. For analytical purpose, it is taken into 
account a bank that has already made the optimal choice on NII activities and then isolate the 
implication of charter value on banking risks alone. In this extended model, the bank is also 
subject to a random shock −e' to equity, where e follows a Bernoulli Distribution:  
 
e = f




An interpretation of shock e is an operational risk shock. The probability that the bank is 
affected by the random shock e depends on the intensity of its monitoring. The more intense 
the monitoring activity (high monitoring cost), the lower the likelihood that it will be affected 







where "(k) is a function of asset size ', the probability of the shock k, and a costant J. A banks 
is therefore incentivized to monitor – in order to reduce the expected equity impact from random 
shock – as long as the marginal monitoring cost does not exceed the marginal impact on bank 
equity from the random shock. Finally, consider $ the continuation value of bank equity; for 
simplicity, it is assumed to be exogenous.  
 
Then, the bank’s new objective function is given by: 
 





subject to the balance constraint  ? + @, + @- = = + ). As previously done, it is possible to 
normalize the bank’s new objective function by asset ' and take expectations. The normalized 
objective function can be written as follows: 
 
H%E<		M7












Since the bank is subject to a new equity shock, the bank’s survival probability is modified to 
4A, reflecting the Bernoulli Distribution of shock e: 
 
4A = I9#J(QR + : − e ≥ 0) 
 
Bank idiosyncratic risk measures can also be modified to account for the new equity shock: 
 
)=PA ≡ 1 − 4′ = I9#J(QR + : − e < 0) 
I9#J(|?#77| ≥ $%&) = I9#J(−QR − : + e ≥ $%&A) = 0.05 
 
Then, in order to obtain the optimal shock probability k∗ is sufficient to derive the first order 
condition with respect to k. Remember that k∗ is the probability that the equity impact of shock 
e is zero (or minimum), and a higher k∗ is associated with more intense monitoring or higher 
monitoring costs. A possible interpretation is that increasing price-to-book values or falling 
leverage incentivizes banks to monitor and to reduce the equity impact of shocks. Based on 
these considerations, there are derived two final propositions that support the analytical 
relationships between idiosyncratic risks and bank leverage. 
 
¨ Proposition 4: Bank idiosyncratic risks measured by EDF’ and VaR’ are decreasing in 









The intuition for the negative relationship between bank idiosyncratic risks and the 
price-to-book value, q, is that higher charter value or long-term profits (captured by q) 
deters risk-taking behavior of banks. A bank is only able to retain its charter value if it 
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survives at the end of the period. Therefore, the higher q, the higher the incentive for 
banks to reduce risk-taking and avoid potential bankruptcy. 
 
¨ Proposition 5: Bank idiosyncratic risks measured by EDF’ and VaR’ are decreasing in 












Higher equity-to-asset ratio : implies more “skin in the game” for banks, and thus they 
will have higher incentives to monitor and reduce risk-taking behaviors to avoid 
defaults. Then, additionally, higher equity increases the buffer against negative shocks 
for banks, which reduce bank risks mechanically through accounting relationships in 
bank balance sheets. 
 
This is the first model that develops a stylized theoretical model that captures bank risks and 
retail-based and market-based NII activities. The stylized theoretical model establishes the 
analytical relationship between financial stability and bank profitability, and between financial 
stability and business models captured by NII activities. These results raise several interesting 
issues for policy makers and financial stability authorities. First, the results highlight the need 
for a clear distinction between different types of NII activities; in general, market-based NII 
activities are riskier than retail-based NII activities. This consideration is very important since 
in a low interest rate environment, banks tend to diversify into NII activities, but this causes a 
shift in a bank’s risk profile. Following, these results highlight the need to evaluate the 
sustainability of bank profitability. An over-reliance on leverage and wholesale funding are 
associated with higher idiosyncratic and contribution to systemic risks and thereby lower 
financial stability. Policy makers and financial stability authorities should pay more attention 
to the source and the sustainability of bank profitability in the design and the calibration of 
macro-prudential stress tests and systemic risk analysis. These findings underscore the 
importance of the effective and timely implementation of the Basel III framework, the need for 
well calibrated macro-prudential tools, and to ensure that banks’ reliance on wholesale funding 





2. Italian banking system  
2.1. An overview of the Italian banking sector 
 
In this section, after having analysed the role of bank profitability and financial stability, we 
focus on the Italian banking system and its specifics.  
 
The big shocks of the last few years (the financial crisis of 2007-09, the ensuing Great 
Recession of 2008-09, the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-12 and the resulting new bout of 
recession) have highlighted the interplay between the conditions of the banking system and the 
macroeconomy. The performance of credit institutions, in particular their profitability, directly 
and heavily depends on macroeconomic developments which are influenced by several other 
factors unrelated to the banking sector.  
In several countries, including Italy, the double recession has resulted in an unprecedented 
worsening of the quality of bank credit, with a dramatic surge in the stock of bad debts and 
other non-performing loans (NPLs) and a corresponding fall in bank profits. At the same time, 
the worsening in financial conditions has contributed to the fall in economic activity during the 
global financial and sovereign debt crises, both in Italy and elsewhere.  
 
The profitability of Italian banks has come under scrutiny in the last few years, for at least two 
reasons. First, in the context of a persistently weak macroeconomic environment, rising credit 
losses, together with the reduction in intermediated funds and the contraction of interest rate 
spreads, have exerted downward pressure on both bank profits and bank capital; these 
developments have in turn affected the availability of credit, thus exacerbating and lengthening 
the real effects of the crisis. Second, because of Basel III Agreement (which imposes tighter 
capital requirements on banks, to be phased-in fully in 2019) the ability of banks to extend 
credit to the economy will depend more than ever on their adequate capitalization. Jointly taken, 
the enduring turbulence in the financial markets and the more stringent Basel III capital 
requirements imply that bank profitability is bound to become an even more important 
component of financial stability (BIS, 2012, and, ECB, 2016). A thorough understanding of the 
determinants of bank profitability in Italy is therefore warranted, especially given today’s 
relatively poor asset quality levels (IMF, 2016).  
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The weak profitability of Italian banks is by no means a recent phenomenon. Already in the 
early 1990s, and for the rest of the decade, Italian banks were underperforming their 
competitors in other major advanced economies. The long-lasting debate on the sources of the 
Italian bank profitability gap further intensified during the most recent crisis, when their 
underperformance become particularly pronounced. In 2011, the tensions in the Italian 
sovereign debt market swiftly spread to National banks, affecting both the cost and availability 
of funding, especially in wholesale markets (Albertazzi et al., 2014). Not only was the Italian 
economy hit more heavily by the financial market turbulences caused by the sovereign debt 
crisis, but because Italian lenders primarily engage in traditional banking activities, they tend 
to be more negatively affected by macroeconomic slumps (Bonaccorsi di Patti et al., 2016).  
 
The analysis available in the literature have identified a number of factors that are likely 
responsible for the low profitability of Italian banks. Some of those factors (such as general 
macroeconomic conditions or the fiscal regime) are by and large external to the banking sector. 
Other factors may represent intrinsic weaknesses in the sector itself, as is the case of the relative 
cost efficiency. The differences in profitability may also be a reflection of their particular 
business model and its related risks, on both the liability (leverage) and asset side (market risk, 
credit risk, interest-rate risk) of the balance sheet, as we have highlighted in the previous 
section.  
 
Since the Nineties many and deep changes have occurred in the Italian banking system. 
Privatisation, European monetary and Economic Unification, increased international 
competition and more operational and organizational complexity represent some examples of 
the most significant factors that have influenced the evolution of the Italian banking system 
(Chiorazzo et al., 2008). The need to address a different operational scenario – characterized, 
first of all, by a decreasing capacity of the net interest income to support the whole banking 
profitability as in the past and by the necessity to diversify the offer in order to satisfy better 
the more complex financial demand of the customers – has forced Italian banks to modify their 
strategies and organizational structures. So, they have answered to these changes also by 
increasing mergers and acquisitions, for the first time considered as a way to enhance 
profitability, efficiency and the competitive positioning on an international basis. The 
concentration process approach by banks is in fact connected to the achievement of some 
advantages, such as economies of scale, especially when referred to the information technology, 
the possibility to enter in specific market segments where the business-size is a relevant factor 
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in order to compose an adequate and well diversified portfolio and, at the same time, to manage 
a global risk.  
 
Moreover, banks have always been the main source of finance for the Italian economy, so 
grasping the main features, strengths and weaknesses of the banking system is essential to 
understanding the country’s economic prospects, especially given the growing integration of 
international financial markets. Banks continue to dominate the Italian financial system despite 
the significant growth of insurance firms and investment funds in recent years. While the 
banking sector has consolidated recent years, the number of small mutual, cooperative, and 
regional banks remains relatively high. In January 2019, about 227 of the 266 mutual banks 
were merged into two new banking groups, which have been classified as SIs; the remaining 
mutual banks will enter into an institutional protection scheme (IPS). These consolidations 
reduced the number of banks in the financial system to about 156 (as of June 2019). As we can 
see, in the Figure 2, during the last decade the number of banks in Italy suffered a great decrease, 
starting from 740 and arriving to 485.  
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of banks during the last decade 
 




The Italian banking system is smaller than those of other European countries. Figure 3 shows 
that the Italian financial system is large by global standard, but smaller than the euro area 
average.  In this small financial system, the importance of banks in providing finance to firms 
stands out. Italian banks’ marked specialization in lending to small businesses has also 
influenced the overall evolution of the system. Very often relations between banks and firms 
are on fiduciary basis that is a serious impediment to the expansion of credit institutions.  
 
Figure 3: Italy – financial system structure (tot. assets of financial institutions in % of GDP) 
 
Source: Financial Stability Board and IMF staff calculation 
 
In fact, the Italian banking system is considered as a bank-oriented system. In a bank-based 
system, banks are important providers of loans to non-financial companies and they are really 
strong in collecting household savings.  
A bank-oriented system is characterized by:  
• Banks are the most important players in the financial sector; 
• Savers use banks as their main investment option; 
• Firms fund investments with bank debt; 
• Strong relationship banking; 
• Banks are involved in the governance of other firms; 
• Banks have strong influence on other financial companies as stock exchange; 
• Insider control system; 
• Organized capital markets are not important as a source of funding; 
• Banks are mostly universal banks. 
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Indeed, the Italian economy is mainly characterized by a huge number of small and medium 
companies which prefer to finance their investments through bank loans.  
 
The financial crisis has brought the long-term profitability of the banking industry to the fore 
and raised many questions. The crisis has shown the flaws of many business models that banks 
adopted during the long phase of credit expansion and innovation. Victims can be found both 
in banks that relied too much on risky trading activities, as well as those whose retail banking 
model was compatible only with the rosy scenario of eternal growth and limitless availability 
of liquidity.  
The Italian banking system is an interesting case in point: historically, it has focused on the 
traditional intermediation between households, companies and the public sector (on a smaller 
scale in the last decades). Italian banks proved to be among the most sound at the onset of the 
crisis: only a few of them had to ask for state-guaranteed bonds and for small amounts (both in 






















2.2. An evaluation of different type of Italian banks 
 
Different types of financial intermediaries are evaluated according to the influence of profit-
seeking on their business strategies. Specifically, the distinction is made on two types of banks: 
commercial banks, namely, privately owned banks that provide services both to general public 
and to private firms; cooperative banks, namely, those with a “per capita” voting mechanism 
that provide services mainly to cooperative members, households, and small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Moreover, commercial banks are profit-driven. They tend to assume large 
risks. By contrast, cooperative banks tend to adopt conservative business strategies and 
stakeholder maximisation policies. In fact, cooperative banks are customer-oriented and are 
particularly efficient in maintaining long-lasting relationships with their members and 
customers. These banks are particularly strong in relationship banking, a type of banking which 
enables banks to make informed decisions in the provision of loans and financial services.  
 
By evaluating different types of banks operating in the Italian market, an attempt is made to 
outline policy implications for the stability of the National financial system. Stability, as we 
have already spoken about in the previous section, is defined both as a situation in which 
financial markets fulfil their allocation function in a satisfactory manner and as the stability of 
the key institutions. The need to discuss such a topic is derived, for instance, from the argument 
that in any banking activity, there is a relationship between profitability and liquidity with 
important implications for financial stability (Stefancic, M., Kathitziotis, N., 2011). 
 
Recalling the previous paragraph, the Italian banking system has undergone a process of 
restructuring and significant consolidation in the 1990s. Developments have been multifaceted 
and had influenced different groups of banks and several financial intermediaries.  
Competition has increased as a result of the financial integration at the EU level. While 
cooperative banks had consolidated their position in local markets, commercial banks and some 
larger popular bank privileged growth strategies on a national level or in the European markets. 
As a result of the above-mentioned changes, commercial and cooperative banks play an even 
more important role for the Italian financial system.  
The evidence from the credit crisis suggests that many commercial banks were not satisfying 
these criteria prior to the crisis. Since they are established with the purpose of maximising 
profits, commercial banks’ primary goal is the creation of profits or, more exactly, the 
maximisation of shareholder value. On the other hand, pre-crisis scholarly research on both 
Italian and European cooperative banks indicated that cooperative banks are, on average, less 
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profitable in “normal” periods but also more stable due to higher solvency ratios (Gutierrez, 
2008). As a result of their embeddedness in local economic systems, their institutional legacies 
and mutualistic values, cooperative banks tend to adopt conservative business strategies and 
stakeholder value maximisation policies in comparison to commercial banks. They are 
customer-oriented, and particularly efficient at maintaining long-lasting relationships with their 
members and customers. In other words, these banks are particularly strong at relationship 
banking, a strategy that enables banks to make informed decisions on the provision of loans 
and financial services as a result of in-depth knowledge of customers’ business.  
Relationship banking generated a number of advantages, such as proximity to customers, which 
may contribute positively to the quality of these banks’ loans. In Italy, cooperative banks can 
also rely on a well-developed commercial network with important historical roots and market 
advantages, which may help to ease their access to information about customers. These 
characteristics may make cooperative banks less vulnerable to shocks to the system, as was the 
case in the last credit crisis.  
 
Italian cooperative banks play an important role for the stability of the financial system at the 
level of regions. They provide credit to individuals and households, as well as capital to SMEs. 
Italian cooperative credit banks are integrated into a distinct network, which grants them an 
adequate level of competitiveness. With the implementation of democratic principles of 
governance, and by relying on traditional yet fully competitive intermediation models, they 
seem to provide the best alternative to standard commercial banks. For this reason, they can be 
viewed as complementary to commercial banks.  
A distinct feature of Italian cooperative credit banks results from a well-developed retail 
business, which enables them to adequately address the financial needs of their cooperative 
members and customers. It comes as no surprise that they show an ability to meet the needs of 
innovative, small-sized and family-owned enterprises, which are typical of the Italian economy. 
  
Despite some significant developments in financial markets that took place in the last decades 
as a result of the financial deregulation,  the liberalisation of the Italian banking market, and a 
rise in competition prompted by technological innovation, the cooperative model in banking 
has preserved its fundamental idiosyncrasies and can be best described as an “originate-to-hold” 
(OTH) model. Banks and financial institutions applying such intermediation model to their 
business take in deposits, and provide credit and financial services primarily to cooperative 
members. They rely primarily on their members and are dependent on the loyalty of retail 
customers.  
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Italian cooperative credit banks operate in “market niches”, they do not specialise in large, risky 
financial investments and transactions, and do not operate in the inter-banking markets as much 
as commercial banks. Cooperative credit banks are well equipped to overcome market failures 
due to their deep rooting in relationship banking, which enables them to develop tailor-made 
services and reduce asymmetries on borrowers. Such model is consistent with cooperative goal 
to maximise stakeholders’ value rather than profits.  
 
Although fundamental differences can be observed within the cooperative credit systems across 
different European countries, a standard governance and business model applies to European 
cooperative banks, including the Italian cooperative credit banks. The model is conceived in 
such a way to compete on a regional and national level; it could hardly compete in international 
markets. By reference to Groeneveld and Sjauw-Koen-Fa (2009), one may argue that the model 
currently shows features such as:  
a) Corporate governance with cooperative ownership; 
b) A policy aimed at increasing the wealth of local communities; 
c) High level of capitalisation; 
d) Stable levels of profits; 
e) A rather conservative business strategy based on retail banking; 
f) Proximity to customers effectively managed through branch networking.  
 
Cooperative banks are common worldwide, but some governance aspects of Italian 
cooperatives can be problematic. While there is no single definition of a bank cooperative in 
Europe, they share some common ownership features, including memberships requirements 
and voting rights limited to one vote per member regardless of the investment. These limitations 
on ownership may hamper effective governance once the bank grows beyond a certain size, as 
well as limit interest from potential outside investors.  
 
There are two categories of bank cooperatives in Italy. The first is the Banche di Credito 
Cooperativo (BCCs), comprised by small entities that account for 6 percent of the banking 
system. These cooperatives’ main lending activity is to grant credit to their members. Their 
shares are non-tradable and held only by members, and they allocate three-quarters of their 
profits to building reserves. The second category is the Banche Popolari (BPs). These entities’ 
assets account for 14 percent of the banking system, can list their shares in the stock exchange. 
They have to allocate only 10 percent of their profits to reserves.  
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Cooperatives are considered the major source of credit to local business. Due to their legal 
status and geographical remit, cooperatives tend to have no exposure to global financial markets 
and the international economy and focus mainly on servicing borrowers. Italian BPs lend up 
two-thirds of their funds to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and have been the main 
provider of credit to those firms since 2008.   
 
Finally, Table 1 summarises the specifics in terms of organisational structure, governance and 




Table 1: Organizational differences between Italian cooperative and commercial banks 
 COOPERATIVE BANKS COMMERCIAL BANKS 
Corporate governance Member ownership Shareholder ownership  
Business strategy OTH (originate to hold) OTD (originate to distribute) 
Profitability Consumer surplus maximisation Short-term maximisation 
Line of business Relationship banking and retail 
segment  
Diversified  

















2.3. Reactions of Italian banking system to the crises   
 
For a clearer description of the impact of the crisis on the Italian banking system, it is 
useful to subdivide the period from 2007 to 2011 into two acute phases: the subprime 
phase of 2007-09, with the turmoil in the financial markets caused by the subprime 
mortgage crisis, aggravated to dramatic proportions by the failure of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, and the sovereign debt phase from 2010 onward, caused by the sovereign 
debt crisis affecting first Greece and then the peripheral countries of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU): Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. 
 
On the eve of the financial crisis, the Italian banking system was still feeling the effects 
of the period of deep restructuring in the 1990s continued in the first decade of this century 
with an increase in concentration, generating significant cost reductions. The restructuring 
had helped to improve the efficiency and competition of the Italian banking industry, and 
before the beginning of the crisis most of Italian banks’ standard performance indicators 
were broadly in line with those of the other large European countries.  
 
The Italian banking and financial system showed more resilience than other national 
systems in the first wave of the global financial crisis, the so-called subprime phase 
(2007–2008), but the impact was much more severe in the second, sovereign debt and 
redenomination risk phase (2010–2012), and the system continues to show major signs of 




I. The financial crisis of 2007-09 was triggered in the summer of 2007 by the collapse of 
the subprime mortgage market in the United States and then spread worldwide has a 
limited impact on the Italian banking system. The virtues of a more traditional business 
model based on careful assessment of borrowers’ creditworthiness, stable funding and 
strict supervision ensured that no Italian bank failed and that government injections of 
capital to banks were extremely modest. The lower degree of development of the Italian 
banking system by comparison with the rest of the Euro area and even more with the 
British and American systems is connected with Italian banks’ traditionally prudent 
lending policies and the relative unimportance of investment banking, which in 
hindsight proved to be much riskier that it might have seemed at first. 
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Prudence has been greatest in lending to households. For mortgage lending, the loan-to-
value ratio is low by international standards. At the same time, Italian banks’ lesser 
propensity for financial innovation discouraged such practices as mortgage equity 
withdrawals, which in some countries were the main driver of mortgage lending. Before 
2007 the expansion of lending had sustained the demand for houses in the UK, Ireland, 
Spain and the United States, sparking a price boom. In Italy, the smaller size of mortgage 
market attenuated the dependence of demand on credit and limited the impact on real 
estate prices. When the bubble burst the house price decline was not as sharp in Italy as 
elsewhere, and the effect on banks’ balance sheets was correspondingly less severe.  
 
The relatively modest amount of investment banking in Italy – linked with customers’ 
lack of financial sophistication and the historic competitive disadvantage of Italian with 
European countries and American banks – was another factor making Italian banks less 
vulnerable to the crisis, thanks to their lesser exposure to opaque and risky financial 
assets. In addition, some cases of bond defaults in previous years had made banks more 
cautious in marketing securities to customers, which attenuated the repercussions of the 
collapse in the financial markets on the portfolios of households and borrower firms. 
Finally, supervisory controls on securitizations prevented them from becoming a source 
of instability (Albertazzi et al., 2011). Special purpose vehicles has no particular 
problems in Italy, and  the conversion of asset-backed securities into potentially risky 
instruments like CDOs and CDOs-squared was negligible. This helped to keep the 
overall leverage of the financial system relatively low. And if during the years of 
financial euphoria this obviously resulted in lower profitability, when the crisis came it 
limited losses.   
Finally, Italian banks’ low degree of internationalization ensured less exposure to the 
worst-hit financial markets. Prudent asset management and less aggressive use of 
leverage permitted greater prudence in funding as well. As we have seen, the share of 
banks’ fund-raising that comes from retail customers is greater than in the other 
countries, while interbank liabilities – on which there was a run that brought the collapse 
of a good number of banks – are more limited.  
During the crisis the greater stability of banks’ sources of funding eased the impact in 
Italy of the tensions in the international money markets, thanks in part to the supervisory 
authorities, who tightened controls on banks’ liquidity as far back as 2007. The milder 
impact of the crisis produced a more moderate deceleration of credit than in other 
countries. The large banks, with their greater dependence on the international interbank 
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and bond markets, slowed their lending more sharply. In part, the resulting slack was 
taken up by smaller banks, which exploited their direct relationships with customers at 
a time of uncertainty over borrowers’ solvency (Panetta and Signoretti, 2010). Credit 
growth is stronger now in Italy than in the euro-area countries as a group. The 
repercussions of the financial crisis of 2007-09 on the productive economy could not 
fail to affect the Italian financial system, but Italian banks weathered the crisis better 
than those in most countries.  
 
Banking regulations introduced in response to the financial crisis are having profound 
effects on prudential and accounting rules and on supervision. The new regulations are 
compressing the size of the banking sector. The Basel III rules raised capital 
requirements, limited average, and established stringent liquidity requirements. 
Additional capital requirements are envisaged for systematically important banks. 
Several countries have introduced measures to separate lending from the financial 
activities that banks carry out on their own account. Looking ahead, these regulatory 
changes will make banks less risky, increasing their capital and liquidity and lowering 
their leverage. However, banks’ profitability and the development of the lending market 
will be under pressure, with potential repercussions on the availability of credit for the 
real economy.  
 
II. With the sovereign debt crisis, the great government interventions in many countries to 
salvage the financial system in the 2007-09 crisis put a strain on Italian banks.  
At first the debt crisis struck Greece, Ireland and Portugal, euro-area countries with 
large budget deficits. During that period, Italian banks’ relative lack of 
internationalization appeared to be strength: by comparison with German and French 
banks, they had much smaller investments in Greece, Ireland and Portugal.  
During the summer of 2011 the sovereign debt crisis spread to Italy and threatened even 
France. Worried that Italian government securities make up some 40 per cent of Italian 
banks’ bond portfolio, the stock markets reacted negatively, with judgments out of line 
with the long-run performance of Italian banks. Home bias in portfolio composition is 
a feature of many other banking systems in countries with large public debts, such as 
Japan and Belgium. For Italian banks, holding the government securities of a euro-area 
country that are eligible as collateral for central bank refinancing has always been a 
factor of soundness. But the changed external framework has transformed what seemed 
to be a strength into a source of vulnerability, even though the pressures on the public 
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debt are due to external causes and not to massive spending on bank bailouts as in, say, 
Ireland. The link between banks’ balance sheets and the state of the public finances is 
much looser today than in the past. Any national banking system inevitably depends on 
the general performance of the country’s economy. The consequences of the sovereign 
debt crisis are hard to foresee but they absolutely cannot be underestimated. A solution 
is essential not only to prevent the collapse of the financial system in some member 
countries but to ensure the very survival of the euro area. When the problem is resolved, 
Italian banks’ traditional caution may well prove, once again, to have been a bulwark 
for the stability of the financial system.  
 
Italy is an especially good case for assessing the effects of the sovereign risk on the 
banking sector. First, the high level of public debt and the heavy exposure of Italian 
banks to the public sector suggests that sovereign tensions are likely to have a strong 
impact on the banking sector. Second, Italy experienced periods of tensions on its 
sovereign debt market also during the 1990s. Third, while in some European countries 
the sovereign crisis started out when government borrowing conditions deteriorated 
following the substantial public interventions to support weak banking sectors, in Italy 
the initial increase in government borrowing costs was related to the weakness of the 
public sector itself in the context of a relatively healthy domestic banking sector.  
 
Sovereign risk transmits to banks’ funding and lending conditions through number of 
different channels, reflecting banks’ high exposure to domestic sovereign debt, the role 
of government securities as collateral in secured transactions and the connections 
between sovereign and banks’ credit ratings (Bank for International Settlements, 2011). 
More precisely, one can identify three main channels through which sovereign tensions 
may be transmitted to bank funding and credit supply conditions: 
o The balance-sheet channel operates when a reduction in the value of 
government bonds held in the portfolios of banks affects their income and 
possibly capital and thus funding ability, potentially triggering a reduction in 
credit supply.  
o The liquidity channel operates when a reduction in the value of sovereign bonds 
reduces banks’ ability to borrow in collateralized interbank transactions. 
Similarly, a bank’s borrowing capacity may be damaged if its rating is 
downgraded following a reduction in sovereign rating, which are typically a 
ceiling for domestic borrowers’ ratings.  
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o The price channel operates when banks’ borrowing cost or loan interest rates 
increase following a rise in government bond yields, due to arbitrage-type 
mechanisms as the latter are one of the most important investment opportunities 
available on the market. 
 
In principle, the intensity of each of these channels is likely to depend on banks’ 
balance-sheet characteristics – such as the level of capitalization, the reliance on 
(un)stable funding sources, the quality of the loan portfolio – as well as on business 
models and lending strategies. For example, banks more reliant on wholesale funding 
are likely to be more severely affected by a dry-up of international capital markets 
following a sovereign crisis.  
 
For Italian banks, a convenient way to explore the heterogeneity in the transmission of 
the sovereign tensions is to  distinguish between the five largest banking groups and the 
rest of the system, since these two groups of financial intermediaries differ significantly 
in terms of balance-sheet characteristic as well as business models and lending 
strategies.  
In general, the largest banks tend to be less capitalized; they tend to fund a larger share 
of their loans through wholesale financing; and, at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis 
they had a greater incidence of bad loans. Moreover, while smaller banks’ activity relies 
almost entirely on traditional banking operations, the largest banks gain a greater share 
of income from non-traditional activities and operations, such as trading and investment 
banking, insurance and other financial services. In addition, while small banks typically 
have a local presence, large banks are geographically diversified, with some of them 
having significant foreign operations. A corollary is that small banks typically rely more 
on soft information for borrowers’ selection and engage relatively more in relationship 
lending. Given these structural differences, one may expect the transmission of 







2.4. An analysis of Italian banking system 
 
After having discussed about the overall Italian banking system in the previous paragraphs, 
now, in order to capture the actual situation of the Italian banking system we will investigate 
the performance of Italian banks from a quantitative point of view (data obtained from Thomson 
Reuters and Bankscope). 
First of all, we analyze some ratios that summarize the overall profitability of Italian banks in 
order to make a general idea about their performance.  
The first summary indicator of profitability we use to analyze the Italian banking system is 
ROE, which, as we have already seen in Chapter 1, is the ratio between net income and 
shareholder’s equity of the year. Since ROE is a very popular measure of profitability and it is 
quite easy to obtain from public information, it allows for fast comparisons between banks and 
it tells the return an investor gets from his investment. In particular, for a bank it is important 
to have a ROE bigger than its cost of capital to produce value for shareholders, since the main 
goal of a firm is to create wealth for its owners. The Figure 4 shows the level of ROE of a 
sample of Italian banks for the period 2001-2019, taking into account the two last decades, to 
highlight the most important crisis (Great Financial Crisis and Sovereign Debt Crisis).  
 
 
Figure 4: ROE (in percentage terms) of Italian banking system 
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As it is possible to figure out from the Figure 4, Italian banks experienced a strong reduction in 
their profitability during the financial crisis. For what concerns the ROE, it started decreasing 
immediately after the beginning of the crisis in 2007, reaching a negative value with a great 
peak up to 10%. Then, it seems to improve after the Great Financial Crisis, even if it was quite 
low. Another negative peak in 2012 highlighted the Sovereign Debt Crisis, an event that 
negatively affect the situation of Italian banking system. From these numbers it seems that after 
the strong reduction in profitability during the last two decades due to the crisis and after the 
strong negative peaks reached in the recent years, the Italian banking system has started 
recovering during the last year, moving toward the pre-crisis level profitability.  
 
Then, as we have explained in the first chapter, another indicator we can use to study the Italian 
bank’s profitability is ROA, which is defined as the ratio between the net income and the 
average value of total assets of the year.  
 
 
Figure 5: ROA (in percentage terms) of Italian banking system 
 
Source: own elaboration on Thomson Reuters and Bankscope database (sample of 19 Italian banks) 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the level of ROA of Italian banks during the last period. With the Great 
Financial Crisis, its level strongly decreased until it become negative. This situation happened 
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As we can see from these two graphs, given that the numerator is the same, the values of ROA 
tend to have the same dynamic of the ones of ROE. Moreover, in Figure 6, we can highlight 
that the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis heavily affected the profitability of Italian 
banks during the last period. In fact, making the comparison, it is possible to evidence the co-
movement of the two indices during the Great Financial Crisis.  
 
 
Figure 6: Comparison between ROA and ROE 
 
Source: own elaboration on Thomson Reuters and Bankscope database (ROA is measured in the right-hand scale) 
 
 
The next step to deepen the analysis about the profitability of Italian banks during the last years 
is to make a focus on two most important factors that affect ROA and ROE during the period 
of the crisis. This analysis is important to study how the crisis hit the different activities 
performed by banks to identify which are the main problems of Italian bank’s profitability today 
and to understand, how certain factors affect the profitability of the banks and then also the 
financial stability, as we will discuss in the next chapter with the empirical analysis.  
 
The first factor to analyze is the presence of NPLs. Non-performing loans (NPLs) are exposures 
to debtors who are no longer able to meet all or part of their contractual obligations because 
their economic and financial circumstances have deteriorated.  
The definitions of NPLs adopted by the Bank of Italy have been harmonized within the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and meet the European Banking Authority (EBA) standards 
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The three subcategories of NPLs are ‘bad loans’, ‘unlikely to pay exposures’ and ‘overdrawn 
and/or past due exposures’. More specifically: 
• Bad loans are exposures to debtors that are insolvent or in substantially similar 
circumstances. 
• Unlikely-to-pay exposures (aside from those included among bad loans) are 
those in respect of which banks believe the debtors are unlikely to meet their 
contractual obligations in full unless action such as the enforcement of 
guarantees is taken. 
• Overdrawn and/or past-due exposures (aside from those classified among bad 
loans and unlikely-to-pay exposures) are those that are overdrawn and/or past-
due by more than 90 days and for above a predefined amount. 
 
The NPLs problem at Italy’s banks is largely the result of the prolonged recession that has hit 
the Italian economy in recent years and of lengthy credit recovery procedures, as it is possible 
to evidence in Figure 7.  
 
The double-dip recession that struck Italy between 2008 and 2014 severely impaired Italian 
banks’ balance sheet and loan quality. It had two phases. The Italian banking system reacted 
relatively well to the 2008-09 recession (phase one of the financial crisis), triggered by the 
collapse of the US subprime mortgage market and the attendant structured products crisis, to 
which Italy’s banks, unlike their European counterparts, were little exposed. However, the 
deterioration in customers’ economic and financial circumstances did lead to a significant 
increase in the flow of new NPLs. Phase two of the financial crisis began in the second half of 
2011 with the Italian sovereign debt crisis. With the new recession, customers’ ability to repay 











Figure 7: Evolution of NPLs (NPLs%Tot.loans ) in the Italian banking system 
 
Source: own elaboration on Thomson Reuters and Bankscope database 
 
 
Another factor that is important to analyse, for the bank performance and subsequently for the 
financial stability, is the income diversification.  
This factor is measured as the ratio between non-interest income and total revenues.  
After the crisis, changes occurred in the banks’ business lines through the enhancement of some 
traditional retail banking segments such as customer credit and mortgage loans. At the same 
time, banks developed new services in the area of payment services, insurance and social 
security, and asset management.  
All these changes had a substantial impact on the structure of bank income and composition of 
bank revenues. Figure 8 depicts this evolution. The non-interest component of operating income 
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Figure 8: Evolution of income diversification (in percentage terms) of Italian banking system 
 
Source: own elaboration on Thomson Reuters and Bankscope database 
 
 
After making this brief analysis, in the Chapter 4 we perform an empirical analysis focusing on 
the Italian banking system to better understand how certain factors (i.e. internal and external 
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3. Literature review 
 
It is argued that bank profitability and stability in financial institutions is a growing concern for 
regulators and bank supervisors. This issue has gained significant attention among researchers, 
in particular after 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
 
A crucial point to take into account is that a high performing banking system has a greater 
ability to safeguard financial adversities. Furthermore, financial system stability has a direct 
relationship with the determinants of bank profitability (Ali, 2015; Borio, 2003; Mörttinen et 
al., 2005). This ascertains that unexplored profitability determinants should be of interest to 
academicians, financial market analysis, bank regulators and managers. This justifies the reason 
why the past literature of bank profitability is flooded with empirical investigations.  
 
The existing literature on bank profitability and its impact on financial stability reports mixed 
evidence. Considering profitability and risks, some researchers found that higher profitability 
leads to higher “charter value” (i.e., long-term expected profitability) and therefore less risk-
taking by banks (Berger et al., 2009). Others suggest that high profitability could loosen 
leverage constraints and lead to more risk-taking (Natalya, Ratnovski, and Vlahu, 2015). 
Furthermore, high profits in good times could be an indicator of systemic tail risk in bad times 
(Meiselman, Nagel, and Purnanandam, 2018).  
In the following two subsections, we make a distinction of the literature between bank 
profitability and financial stability to better understand the analysis that we will do in the 
empirical work. Finally, we make a literature review about the econometric methodology 










3.1. Bank profitability literature  
 
Bank performance has been extensively studied in the past. Early work goes back to Short 
(1979) and Bourke (1989), who were followed by a series of papers which attempted to identify 
some of the major determinants of bank profitability.  
 
Despite the increased trend toward bank disintermediation observed in many countries, the role 
of banks remains central in financing economic activity in general and different segments of 
the market in particular. A sound and profitable banking sector is better able to withstand 
negative shocks and contribute to the stability of the financial system. Therefore, the 
determinants of bank performance have attracted the interest of academic research as well as of 
bank management, financial markets and bank supervisors.  
 
The respective empirical studies have focused their analysis either on cross-country evidence 
or on the banking system of individual countries.  
 
The studies by Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), 
Staikouras and Wood (2004), Goddard et al., (2004), Athanasoglou et al., (2006), Micco et al., 
(2007) and Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) investigate a panel dataset. Studies by Berger et 
al., (1987), Berger (1995), Mamatzakis and Remoundos (2003), Naceur and Goaied (2008), 
Athanasoglou et al., (2008) and Garcia-Herrero et al., (2009) focus their analysis on single 
countries, as we will made for our analysis focusing on the Italian case.  
 
The empirical results of these above-mentioned studies do vary, which is to be expected, given 
the differences in their datasets, time periods, investigated environments, and countries. 
However, it is possible to find some mutual elements that we used to categorize further the 
determinants of banking profitability.  
Usually, bank profitability is measured by the return on average assets, return on average equity 
and net interest margin, and it is expressed as a function of internal and external determinants. 
The internal determinants originate from banks accounts (balance sheets and/or profit and loss 
accounts) and therefore could be termed as bank-specific determinants of profitability.  
The external determinants, such as macroeconomic variables, are not related to bank 
management but reflect the economic and legal environment that affect the operation and 
performance of banks.  
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In most studies, variables such as bank size, risk capital ratio and operational efficiency are 
used as internal determinants of banking profitability (e.g., Bourke, 1989; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huzinga, 1999; Goddard et al., 2004; Javaid et al., 2011; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). 
The external determinants of bank profitability, as presented in the literature, include factors 
such as the inflation rate and GDP growth rate. Most studies (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huzinga, 1999) have shown a positive relationship between inflation, GDP 
growth, and bank profitability.  
 
Iannotta (2007) find a positive and significant relationship between the size and the profitability 
of a bank. This is because larger banks are likely to have a higher degree of product and loan 
diversification than smaller banks, and because they should benefit from economies of scale. 
Other authors, such as Berger et al., (1987), provide evidence that costs are reduced only 
slightly by increasing the size of a bank and that very large banks often encounter scale 
inefficiencies. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) work attribute a negative relationship of bank size and 
profitability due to agency costs, other expenses of large firms and the overhead expenses of 
bureaucratic processes. In sum, our literature analysis suggests that bank size and bank 
profitability relationship remain inconclusive and requires further investigation.  
 
The solvency risk plays an important role to predict bank profitability (Adusei, 2015). The 
capital strength of a bank is measured through solvency risk (equity to total asset ratio), while 
strong bank equity allows a bank to absorb external/internal shocks (Curak et al., 2012). It is a 
noteworthy point that the bank considers its capital as a safety pillow through which a bank 
enables to mitigate insolvency risk by maintaining a higher amount of capitalization. In this 
way, risk-return hypothesis state that such type of a bank observes low profitability. However, 
well-capitalized banks with creditworthiness enhance the confidence of customer deposits, 
which results, lower interest rates, interest expenses and external financing. Furthermore, lower 
risk (greater equity to asset ratio) would increase bank profitability. Hence, bank profitability 
and solvency risk may have a positive relationship.  
 
Abreu and Mendes (2002), who examined banks in Portugal, Spain, France and Germany, find 
that the loans-to-assets ratio, as a proxy for risk, has a positive impact on the profitability of a 
bank. Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992), among others, find a negative and 
significant relationship between the level of risk and profitability. This result might reflect that 
financial institutions that are exposed to high-risk loans also have a higher accumulation of 
unpaid loans. These loan losses lower the return of the affected banks.  
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The need for risk management in the banking sector is inherent in the nature of the banking 
business. Poor asset quality and low levels of liquidity are the two major causes of bank failures. 
During periods of increased uncertainty, financial institutions may decide to diversify their 
portfolios and/or raise their liquid holdings in order to reduce their risk. In this respect, risk can 
be divided into credit and liquidity risk. Molyneux and Thornton (1992), among others, find a 
negative and significant relationship between the level of liquidity and profitability. In contrast, 
Bourke (1989) reports an opposite result, while the effect of credit risk on profitability appears 
clearly negative (Miller and Noulas, 1997). This result may be explained by taking into account 
the fact that the more financial institutions are exposed to high-risk loans, the higher is the 
accumulation of unpaid loans, implying that these loan losses have produced lower returns to 
many commercial banks.  
 
The last group of profitability determinants deals with macroeconomic control variables. The 
variables normally used are the inflation rate, the long-term interest rate and/or the growth rate 
of money supply. Revell (1979) introduces the issue of the relationship between bank 
profitability and inflation. He notes that the effect of inflation on bank profitability depends on 
whether banks’ wages and other operating expenses increase at a faster rate than inflation. The 
question is how mature an economy is so that future inflation can be accurately forecasted and 
thus banks can accordingly manage their operating costs. Most studies (e.g. Bourke, 1989; 
Molyneux and Thornton, 1992) have shown a positive relationship between either inflation or 







3.2. Financial stability literature 
In this section, we highlight the importance of risk measures for evaluating the financial 
stability of a single country. A large number of authors focused their attention on the most used 
measure for quantifying the risk, distinguishing between idiosyncratic and systemic ones.  
The theoretical and empirical literature on these issues was flourishing and one main measure 
of individual soundness was commonly used to analyse the impact of financial mutations and 
market structure on financial stability: the Z-score developed by Roy (1952).  
 
It is an accounting-based risk measure generally viewed in the banking literature as a measure 
of bank soundness (see, e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Lepetit and Strobel, 2013; Fu et al., 
2014). As we have already discussed in Chapter 1, the Z-score indicator is inversely related to 
the probability of a bank’s insolvency. A higher Z-score implies a lower probability of 
insolvency and lower risks. It combines in one single indicator the bank profitability, bank 
capital and return volatility.  
 
After having considered the individual risk of a bank, recent literature proposed a market-based 
measure to assess the contribution of a single bank to the systemic risk, e.g. the delta conditional 
value-at-risk (Δ"#$%&). This measure could be useful to control the dynamics of systemic risk 
as perceived by the market. Several papers have dealt first with the problem of finding a 
commonly shared definition for systemic risk and then with the issue of developing a 
methodology for its measurement.  
As explained in Chapter 1, systemic risk has been defined as the risk that the intermediation 
capacity of the financial system is impaired, with potentially adverse consequences for real 
economy, triggered by the distress or disorderly failure of one, or more, financial institutions.  
 
There are two ways of measuring bank contribution to systemic risk. A first approach, to which 
we refer to as supervisory approach, relies on firm-specific information on cross-jurisdictional 
activity, size, interconnectedness, substitutability, and complexity. This approach considers 
annual accounting and other confidential data provided to regulators by financial institutions 
and usually not captured by the markets (Gourieroux et al., 2012; Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2011, 2013, 2018; Greenwood et al., 2015).  
A second approach, to which we refer to as market-based approach, relies on publicly available 
market data, such as stock prices and/or credit default swap (CDS) spreads (see Segoviano 
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Basurto and Goodhart 2009), which are high frequency and forward-looking data and 
incorporate early warning signals for systemic crisis.  
As observed by Benoit et al., (2017), the data needed for the supervisory approach are disclosed 
with a lag (e.g. since they are mainly accounting data). Conversely, the market-based approach 
considers high frequency data and it is more sensitive to changes in systemic risk regimes. 
Public authorities look for proper measures of systemic risk that go beyond the different sources 
of systemic risk implied in the supervisory approach. Being the scope of these authorities to 
operationally set capital requirements, market-based systemic risk measures must provide 
stable results to be implemented in practice and they should be sufficiently reliable for a day-
to-day use.  
A prominent example of this market-based approach is the delta conditional value-at-risk 
(Δ"#$%&) proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011): it can be estimated on a high 
frequency basis, it incorporates early warning signals and it could be considered as a tool to 
assess if a systemic event occurs. It is considered in the academic literature as the most 
influential paper on market-based systemic risk measures.  
Over the past years, several research papers have discussed and implemented market-based 
systemic risk measures. Several works discussed if the Δ"#$%& measure proposed by Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2011) is a proper systemic risk measure (e.g. Bernard et al., 2012; Benoit et 
al., 2017). However, only a few papers estimated the same systemic risk measure through 
alternative methodologies and compared these estimates.  
The "#$%& methodology proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) seems to solve the 
problems outlined in the supervisory approach (difficulty to obtain detailed information on 
cross-exposures, typically owned by central banks and not publicly available).  
In fact, it is based on publicly observable balance sheet and market data. Moreover, that 
methodology has an advantage over the employment of CDS data in the sense that, under the 
assumption of market efficiency, the stock market price should reflect all types of risk toward 
which a financial institution is exposed.  
 
After considering the measures of financial stability most adopted by the literature, now we 
focus on the determinants that could affect them.  
 
The possible explanation between size-stability relationships can be explained by the agency 
theory of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The agency theory submits that manager’s 
actions and decisions become inordinately skewed toward personal gain. In this sense, the size 
of a firm is increased because of the managerial empire-building, hence, bad governance 
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associates with large firms. In this way, this study expects a negative relationship between 
financial stability and bank size. Similarly, the size-stability relationship is also explained by 
the stewardship theory. Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Davis et al., (1997) suggest that 
managers of the firm fairly use the resources of the firm and they are considered as inherently 
trustworthy employees. But, unlike the agency theory, stewardship theory submits that increase 
in the size of a firm may enhance its stability. By extraction, this theory posits a positive 
relationship between financial stability and bank size.  
One study of Laeven et al., (2014) analyze the effect of bank size on financial stability. The 
study reports that smaller banks are less risky than larger banks. In contrast, Kohler (2015) 
investigates the effect of bank business and stability model using a sample data from European 
Union (EU) banks. His research indicates that bank size shows a negative and significant effect 
on stability. Thus, we draw an obvious conclusion that the size-stability relationship is 
inconclusive and requires further empirical support.  
 
The relationship between bank funding risk and stability receiving a considerable amount of 
attention among the researchers (Adusei, 2015). In this context, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) 
suggest that bank wholesale funding reduces risk through efficient utilization of bank resources 
and capital diversification. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) suggest that bank instability 
is mainly associated with the larger portion of non-deposit funding. However, Kohler (2015) 
associate non-deposit funding risk with a different type of banks. This signifies that share of 
non-deposit funding has a negative impact on stability of retail-oriented banks, while this 
relationship is positive for investment banks. Moreover, Adusei (2015) report a positive 
relationship between bank stability and funding risk. Hence, it is important to examine the 
relationship between these two variables. 
 
A substantial portion of the bank diversification literature focuses on U.S banks with fewer 
studies on other developed or emerging banking systems. Kohler (2014) studies German banks 
and finds that retail-oriented institutions become more stable when they increase non-interest 
income activities. Sanya and Wolfe (2011) analyze a sample of banks from 11 emerging 
countries between 2000 and 2007 and find that diversification improves profitability and 
stability. In contrast to the aforementioned literature, a range of other studies arrive at the 
counter conclusion, namely, that bank diversification increases risks. DeYoung and Roland 
(2001), for instance, find that banks non-traditional sources of income increases revenue 
volatility. Similarly, Acharya et al., (2006) link increased non-interest income to poorer 
performance as diversification reduces bank loan monitoring incentives. Stiroh and Rumble 
 60 
(2006) investigate the association between bank diversification, risk and profitability for a 
sample of U.S financial holding companies. They find that non-interest based activities improve 
profitability but also increase risk. This suggests that it is not diversification of itself but how 
the diversification process is managed that determines whether there will be performance or/and 
risk benefits forthcoming.  
 
Credit risk plays an important role in the financial stability. Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) 
analyze the relationship between liquidity and credit risks, and their impact on the soundness 
of 4300 US commercial banks over the period 1998-2010, including 254 failures banks during 

























3.3. Econometric methodology literature 
 
Panel data analysis was adopted for conducting the econometric modelling. The term panel 
refers to the pooling of observations of separate units (countries, banks, groups of people etc..) 
on the same set of variables over several time periods (Baltagi, 2001). 
Prior to describing the model, it is important to stipulate the reasons why panel data analysis 
can be beneficial, as well as distinguishing between the models used in panel data analysis. 
Among the main advantages of panel data, compared to other types of data, is that the approach 
allows the testing and adjustment of the assumptions that are implicit in cross-sectional 
analysis. A number of econometricians state that the use of panel data analysis can be very 
beneficial in a number of ways, including:  
 
• Panel data suggest that individual countries, banks, etc., are heterogeneous; 
• Panel data give more information, more variability, less collinearity among other 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency; 
• Panel data can capture and measure effects that are not detectable in cross-section time 
series analysis.   
 
 
Following the work made by Sufian et al., (2008) about the Philippines, the authors in order to 
test the relationship between bank profitability, bank specific and macroeconomic 
determinants, they estimate a linear regression model in the following form: 
l"C = É" + ^
A.$"C + Ñ
A.BC + Ö"C , 
where j refers to an individual financial institution; t refers to year; l"C refers to the return on 
assets (ROA) and is the observation of financial institution j in a particular year t; .$ represents 
the internal factors (determinants) of a financial institution; .B represents the external factors 
(determinants) of a financial institution; Ö"C is a normally distributed random variable 
disturbance term. They apply the least square method to a fixed effects (FE) model, where the 
standard errors are calculated by using White’s (1980) transformation to control for cross-
section heteroscedasticity. The opportunity to use a fixed effects model rather than a random 
effects model has been tested with the Hausman test. To check for the robustness of the results, 




The same analysis is conducted by Roman et al., (2013), regarding the Romanian case. They 
analyzed a sample of 15 commercial banks that operate in Romania and that hold together 
78.10% of the total bank assets. Moreover, they have selected only commercial banks that have 
available information between 2003 and 2011. The paper uses panel due to the advantage that 
it has: it helps to study the behavior of each bank over time and across space (Baltagi, 2001). A 
multiple linear regression model was issued to determine the relative importance of each 
explanatory variable in affecting the performance of bank.  
The general linear regression model is: 
Ü$C = 8 + Ñ$.$C + M$C 
where Ü$C stands for the dependent variable observed for i-th bank at time t; X is the independent 
variable (including the internal and external determinants); Ñ is the coefficient for explanatory 
variables; i=2….N; c is a constant term; M represent the error term of the model.  
 
 
Menicucci and Paolucci (2015) have investigated the relationship between bank-specific 
characteristics and profitability in European banking sector to find the role of internal factors 
in achieving high profitability. A regression analysis is built on an unbalanced panel data set 
comprising 175 observations of 35 top European banks over the period 2009-2013. To test the 
relationship between bank profitability and bank-specific determinants described before, they 
use a linear regression model. The feedback from the literature on bank profitability reveals 
that the functional linear form of analysis is the proper one. A linear model is used to analyze 
the cross-section time series data and a simple linear equation is estimated using pooled sample 
of European banks in the period 2009-2013. Hence, the basic estimation strategy is to pool the 
observations across banks and apply the regression analysis on the pooled sample. They select 
panel data because they allow to measure respectively individual variability and dynamic 
change of the cross-section units over time.  
To examine the profits’ determinants of European banks, they estimate a linear regression 
model in the following form: 
l"C = ÉC + ^$C
A .$"C + Ö"C 
where j refers to an individual bank; t refers to year; l"C refers to the profitability of bank j at 
time t and it is the observation of bank j in a particular year t; .$ represents the internal factors 
(determinants) of a bank’s profitability; Ö"C is a normally distributed random variable 
disturbance term (error term). Extending the above equation to reflect the variables considered 
in the study, the regression model is formulated as follows:  
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l"C = ÉD + ^0<_5)"C + ^;"'I"C + ^E?('@"C + ^F=)I"C + ^G??I"C + Ö"C , 
where l"C is the profitability of bank j at time t. Three indicators, namely, ROA, ROE and NIM 
represent three alternative performance measures for bank j during the period t. Hence, three 
models are alternatively tested in the analysis, and each one includes a different measure of 
profitability (dependent variable).  
 
 
Another work developed by Merin (2016), is focused on a single country, specifically 
considering private commercial banks that operate in Ethiopia.  
The researcher collected financial data from the annual reports of the sampled banks for the 
period of 2004-2011. Besides to financial data, macroeconomic data were gathered from 
National bank of Ethiopia.  
The analysis used panel model to analyze the collected data. As we have already discussed, 
panel model is a combination of cross sectional and time series observations. For this study, 
fixed effect model is selected. It is one panel model which control for unobserved heterogeneity 
among cross sectional units. The following equation indicates the general model of the study: 






: + Ö$C , 
where Π$C is the dependent variable and is observation on profitability measures of ROA, for 
bank i at time t, and c is the constant term. ∑ Ñ--H0 .$C-  is a vector of HCI bank specific 
variables. While the second set of independent variables ∑ Ñ::H0 .$C:   is the vector of `CI 
external variables and Ö$C is the error term.  
 
 
In the work made by Ali and Puah (2018), they examine the internal determinants of bank 
profitability and stability in Pakistan banking sector. The methodology that is used is a panel 
regression analysis built on a balanced panel data using 24 commercial banks over the sample 
period of 2007-2015. The authors performed a separate analysis of bank profitability and 
stability. Both models used a comprehensive set of bank internal determinants.  
Based on the past empirical studies, they develop their panel data models to examine the impact 
of bank internal variable on its profitability and stability: 
 




r<ä'r = ^ + Ñ0r<_5) + Ñ;?&_<â + ÑE"&_<â + ÑFP&_<â + ÑG&(' + P"(=ãåå)
+ Ö				(2) 
 
According to equations (1) and (2), BSTAB shows bank stability, whereas ROE and ROA 
represent profitability; BSIZE is bank size; FRISK denotes fund risk; LRISK indicates liquidity 
risk; CRISK highlights credit risk and FC(DUMM) is used as a dummy variable for financial 
crisis. They use independent variables in t-1 while dependent variable in time t. This implies 
that our independent variables are lagged variables to mitigate the potential problem of 
endogeneity (Adusei, 2015; Hannan and Prager, 2009). 
 
 
Now, in this following part, we consider some works that are made using the dynamic panel 
regression. The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator is an extension of the 
Arellano-Bond estimator that accommodates large autoregressive parameters and a large ratio 
of the variance of the panel – level effect to the variance of idiosyncratic error. The Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator is designed for datasets with many panels and few 
periods, which is the case of the following mentioned analyses.  
 
Considering the analysis made by Athanasoglou et al., 2008, they use an unbalanced panel of 
Greek commercial banks since it contains banks entering or leaving the market during the 
sample period (e.g. due to mergers). Unbalanced panels are more likely to be the norm in studies 
of a specific country’s bank profitability. The following model forms the basis of their 
estimation: 













- + Ö$C 
In static relationships the literature usually applies least squares methods on fixed effects (FE) 
or random effects (RE) models. However, in dynamic relationships these methods produce 
biased (especially as the time dimension T gets smaller) and inconsistent estimates (see Baltagi, 
2001). Following Arellano and Bond (1991), they suggest that consistency and efficiency gains 
can be obtained by using all available lagged values of the dependent variable plus lagged 
values of the exogenous  regressors as instruments. Yet, the Arellano and Bond estimator has 
been criticized when applied to panels with very small T, the argument being that under such 
conditions this estimator is inefficient if the instruments used are weak (Arellano and Bover, 
1995). However, in this study T=17, which is larger enough to avoid such problems. 
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Consequently, they will proceed with the estimation of their model using GMM estimator in 
the Arellano and Bond paradigm.  
 
 
Focusing again on a specific country, we refer to Dietrich and Wanzenried (2010) work, where 
they make evidence from Switzerland. To empirically investigate the effects of internal and 
external factors on bank profitability, they follow Athanasoglou et al., (2008) and Garcia-
Herrero et al., (2009) and use a linear model given by: 









K + Ö$C 
PERF$C is profitability of bank i at time t, with i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T, c is a constant term, .$C’s 
are the bank-specific and market specific explanatory variables as outlined above, and Ö$C is the 
disturbance term. As made before, they specify a dynamic panel model by including a lagged 
dependent variable among the regressors, i.e. PERF$,C10 is the one-period lagged profitability 
and É the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. A value of É between 0 and 1 implies persistence 
of profits, but they will eventually return to their normal level. A value close to 0 indicates an 
industry that is fairly competitive, while a value close to 1 implies a less competitive structure.  
Given the dynamic nature of the model, least squares estimation methods produce biased and 
inconsistent estimates (see Baltagi, 2001). Therefore, they use again the techniques for dynamic 
panel estimation that are able to deal with the biases and inconsistencies of their estimates. 
Following Garcia-Herrero et al., (2009), they address these problems by employing the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) following Arellano and Bover (1995), also known as 
system GMM estimator. This methodology accounts for endogeneity. The system GMM 
estimator uses lagged values of the dependent variable in level and in differences as 
instruments, as well as lagged values of other regressors which could potentially suffer from 
endogeneity.   
As previously stated, these analyses are designed for datasets with many panels and few 
periods, which is not our case, for this reason we do not implement this dynamic panel 







4. Italian empirical analysis  
4.1. Data source and research methodology   
 
To investigate the determinants of Italian banks’ profitability and financial stability, we collect 
a sample data of 19 Italian banks, which includes commercial and cooperative ones. 
Because of data constraints, our panel data is unbalanced and covers a sample period of 2006-
2019. Considering this time period, it is possible to shed light on the two most important crisis 
that affected the Italian banking system: the Great Financial Crisis and the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis.  
The data has been examined by applying a panel data multiple regression.  
As in many prior studies, we have adopted a descriptive analysis to explore the combined effect 
of internal and external determinants on the bank profitability and financial stability of the 
selected banks.  
In the following paragraphs, first, information regarding dataset, sample selection, dependent 
and independent variables is given. Then, the models of the study including the mentioned 
variables are developed.  
The bank-level financial statements are derived from the Bankscope Database and Thomson 
Reuters Datastream.  
Bankscope database supplies annual financial information for banks in 180 countries all over 
the world and thus it is considered the most comprehensive database for research in banking.  
There is a major benefit to use this data source; the information at the bank level is highlighted 
in standardized formats, after adjusting for differences in accounting and reporting standards 
across countries. We removed duplicate information, i.e. we focused attention on consolidated 
data if Bankscope reported both unconsolidated and consolidated.  
Daily market data, explained in detailed later on and crucial to compute the systemic risk 
measure, are extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
The investigation of banks’ profitability and financial stability is particularly interesting in the 
selected period, as the financial system and banks have been exposed to several financial shocks 
and challenges.  
We use both descriptive statistics and econometric tools to analyse the collected data.  
A panel regression analysis is built on an unbalanced panel data using 19 commercial banks 
over the sample period 2006-2019.  
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We need to perform a separate analysis of bank profitability and financial stability. All the 
models used a comprehensive set of bank internal determinants and external macroeconomic 
determinants. 
 
4.1.1. Determinants of bank profitability and variables selection 
 
In this section, we describe both the dependent and independent variables that we select for our 
analysis on bank profitability. See Table 2 for a summary of the variables described below.  
For our empirical analysis, we use as dependent variable the return on assets (ROA) which is 
defined as the ratio of net income to total assets.  
In principle, ROA shows the profits earned per unit of assets and reflects management ability 
to utilize banks’ financial and real investment resources to generate profits.  
ROA has emerged as the key ratio for the evaluation of bank profitability and has become the 
most common measure of it.  
In the following pages we make a brief description of the bank specific and macroeconomic 
profitability determinants.  
Bank specific profitability determinants:  
 
§ Asset size (SIZE): one of the most important questions underlying bank policy is which size 
optimizes bank profitability. In particular, larger-sized banks are able to invest a lot of 
money in ICT (Information and Communication Technology), so they can build up know-
how and technologies for high-quality risk management. Furthermore, a larger size allows 
the bank to operate more business lines and with a wider range of customers. On the other 
hand, small-sized banks could benefit both from a greater operating flexibility, i.e., being 
able of adapting their strategies very quickly to the changing economic environment, and 
from lower fixed operating costs.  
Generally, the effect of a growing size on profitability has been proved to be positive to a 
certain extent. However, for banks that become extremely large, the effect of size could be 
negative due to bureaucratic and other reasons. Hence, the size profitability relationship 
may be expected to be non-linear. We use banks’ total assets (logarithm) in order to capture 
this possible non-linear relationship.  
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§ Funding costs (FC): are defined as interest expenses over customers deposits, vary across 
banks over time. Overall, banks that are able to raise funds more cheaply than others, are 
expected to be more profitable.  
§ Income diversification of bank (DIV): for determining this measure of diversification we 
consider the following variables: NET (net interest income) and NII (net non-interest 
income). We take their respective shares in net operating income (NET+NII): 
NETs = NET/(NET+NII) 
NIIs = NII/(NET+NII) 
then, following the empirical work of Chiorazzo et al., (2008), we define the measure of 
income diversiifcation as: 
DIV = 1 – (NETs2 + NIIs2) 
In order to measure the income diversification level of each bank, we calculate the widely 
used Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) for all banks. By construction, under the constraint 
that NET and NII have to assume positive values, such an index varies from 0.0 to 0.5. It is 
equal to zero when diversification reaches its minimum and equal to 0.5 when there is 
complete diversification. Positive values of this variable indicate that income diversification 
improves bank profitability.  
The decline in interest margins during the last decade has changed the traditional role of 
banks and forced them to search for new sources of revenue. In this context, Elsas et al., 
(2010) find that, initially, commercial banks typically increase diversification by moving 
into fee-based businesses. Then, they expand their business into trading activities or by 
underwriting insurance contracts. For this reason, the effect of diversification of income on 
bank profitability is not clear. Recently, both Chiorazzo et al., (2008) and Elsas et al., (2010) 
conclude that revenue diversification enhances bank profitability via higher margins from 
non-interest businesses. In particular, focusing on our Italian case, we expect a positive 
relationship between bank profitability and income diversification. 
§ Capital adequacy (EA): in line with previous research from, among others, Athanasoglou 
et al., (2008) and Iannotta et al., (2007), the ratio of equity to assets is used as a measure of 
capital strength. Following Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014), they use this simple measure 
of common equity to total assets instead of measuring a risk-based bank’s capital strength 
as suggested in the Basel II and Basel III framework. Models with risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) are problematic as they rely heavily on banks’ internal models about the risk levels 
of individual loans, with many parameters calibrated, making it almost impossible to 
compare banks. Moreover, data on RWA are not available for many banks and over time. 
Anticipating the net impact of changes in this ratio is complex: for example, banks with 
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higher capital-to-asset ratios are considered relatively safer and less risky compared to 
institutions with lower capital ratios. In line with the conventional risk-return hypothesis, 
we expect banks with lower capital ratios to have higher returns in comparison to better-
capitalized financial institutions. In contrast, highly capitalized banks are safer and remain 
profitable even during economically difficult times. Furthermore, a lower risk increases a 
bank’s creditworthiness and reduces its funding costs. In addition, banks with higher equity-
to-asset ratios normally have a reduced need for external funding, which has again a positive 
effect on their profitability. Given that we have anticipated effects pointing in opposite 
directions, the impact of a bank’s capitalization on its profitability cannot be anticipated 
theoretically.  
§ Credit risk (CRISK): the ratio of impaired loans over total gross loans is a measure of a 
bank’s credit quality. Theory suggests that increased exposure to credit risk is normally 
associated with decreased firm profitability and, hence, we expect a negative relationship 
between ROA and this ratio. Banks would, therefore, improve profitability by improving 
screening and monitoring credit risk and such policies involve the forecasting of future 
levels of risk. A higher ratio indicates a lower credit quality and, therefore, a lower 
profitability. Thus, we expect a negative effect from the loan loss provisions relative to total 
loans on bank profitability.  
§ Deposit share (DEPOSIT): this ratio is a variable measuring the amount of deposits held 
by a bank proportional to its size. Deposits are banks’ primary sources of funds that they 
can invest to generate income. Therefore, a positive correlation between the bank 
profitability (especially measured by ROA) and deposits ratio is expected (Davydenko, 
2010).  
 
Macroeconomic profitability determinants: 
 
There is a considerable evidence showing that country-level macroeconomic and financial 
structure variables have a significant impact on bank performance.  
In addition to the bank-specific variables described above, the analysis includes a set of 
macroeconomic characteristics that we expect to have an impact on bank profitability.  
To measure the relationship between economic and market conditions and bank profitability, 
we need to consider two determinants: 
 
§ Gross domestic product (GDP): bad economic conditions can worsen the quality of the 
loan portfolio, generating credit losses and increasing the provisions banks need to hold, 
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thus reducing bank profitability. In contrast, an improvement in economic conditions, in 
addition to improve the solvency of borrowers increases demand for credit by households 
and firms, with positive effects on the profitability of banks (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). At 
the same time, following Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) conclude that the pro-cyclical 
nature of bank profits derives from the effects that the economic cycle exerts on the net 
interest income (through lending activity) and loan loss provisions (via credit quality). For 
this reason, we can expect a positive relationship between economic growth and bank 
profitability.  
 
§ Inflation rate (INF): another important macroeconomic condition which may affect both 
the costs and revenues of banks is the inflation rate. The effect of inflation rate on bank 
profitability depends on whether wages and other operating expenses increase at a faster 
rate than the inflation. Most studies (e.g. Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992) 
have found a positive relationship between inflation and profitability. However, if inflation 
is not anticipated and banks do not adjust their interest rates correctly, there is a possibility 
that costs may increase faster than revenues and hence affect bank profitability adversely. 
Accordingly, the overall effect is theoretically undetermined.   
 
Table 2: Summary of variable selection about bank profitability – ROA 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
ROA Net income/Total assets 
 
 
INDIPENDENT VARIABLES DESCRIPTION EXPECTED 
EFFECT 
ASSET SIZE (SIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets +/- 
FUNDING COSTS (FC) Interest expenses/Customer 
deposits 
_ 
INCOME DIVERSIFICATION (DIV) 1-(NETs2 + NIIs2) + 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY (EA) Total equity/Total assets +/- 
CREDIT RISK (CRISK) Impaired loans/Gross loans _ 
DEPOSIT SHARE (DEPOSIT) Customer deposits/total assets + 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) Annual real GDP growth rate  + 
INFLATION RATE (INF) Annual inflation rate  +/- 
Source: own elaboration  
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4.1.2. Determinants of financial stability and variables selection – Z-score  
 
In this section, we describe both the dependent and independent variables that we selected for 
our analysis on financial stability. See Table 3 for a summary of the variables described below. 
Consistent with past studies, we measure the financial stability distinguishing between 
idiosyncratic and systemic risk. The former is calculated using Z-score as a measure of bank 
stability (Adusei, 2015; Stiroh, 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and Huzinga, 2010). The latter, as we 
have explained in the literature review section, is measured by Δ"#$%& (Adrian and 
Brunnermeier, 2011).  
In this paragraph we focus on the determinants of financial stability at individual level.  
The dependent variable used is Z-score that as previously explained proxies the bank stability 
at individual level.  
Bank specific and macroeconomic financial stability determinants:  
 
§ Bank profitability (ROA): as stated by lots of empirical works, between bank profitability 
and bank stability there is a positive relationship. Since Z-score is a proxy of bank stability, 
higher bank profitability leads necessarily to higher bank stability.  
 
§ Asset size (SIZE): it is assessed as the natural log of total assets; the size-stability 
relationship is inconclusive and requires further empirical support.  
 
§ Funding risk (FRISK): the funding risk is denoted by Z-score and is calculated through the 
sum of the deposit-to-total asset ratio and the equity-to-total asset ratio, which is further 
divided by the standard deviation of the deposit-to-total asset ratio. The relationship is 
ambiguous, so we need to examine if it positive or negative.  
 
§ Income diversification (DIV): as we have highlighted in the literature section, the 
relationship between income diversification and financial stability is uncertain. But, 
focusing on our Italian case, we can expect a negative relationship since higher returns 
obtained from income diversification leads higher volatility which characterized non-
interest income.  
 
§ Credit risk (CRISK): following the previous section with the analysis on bank profitability, 
also the relationship between credit risk and financial stability at individual level is 
negative.  
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§ Capital adequacy (EA): for this variable we expect a positive sign since higher is the equity-
to-asset ratio, the less leveraged the company is.  
 
§ Loans share (LOAN): this ratio is obtained dividing net loans to total assets; in this case, 
we expect a negative relationship since the higher the ratio is, the riskier a bank may be to 
higher defaults.  
 
§ Gross domestic product (GDP): the relationship that we expect is clearly positive since 
higher GDP growth rate affects positively the bank stability of an individual institution.  
 
§ Inflation rate (INF): for this variable we expect a negative relationship, since we want to 
maintain the price stability that is required by Bank of Italy.  
 
 
Table 3: Summary of variable selection about financial stability – Z-score 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Z-SCORE (CAR + ROA)/+ROA 
 
 
INDIPENDENT VARIABLES DESCRIPTION EXPECTED 
EFFECT 
BANK PROFITABILITY (ROA) Net income/Total assets + 
ASSET SIZE (SIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets +/- 







ë +í (=)I/ä') 
+/- 
INCOME DIVERSIFICATION (DIV) 1-(NETs2 + NIIs2) _ 
CREDIT RISK (CRISK) Impaired loans/Gross loans _ 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY (EA) Total equity/Total assets + 
LOANS SHARE (LOAN) Net loans/Total assets _ 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) Annual real GDP growth rate  + 
INFLATION (INF) Annual inflation rate  _ 





4.1.3. Determinants of financial stability and variables selection – ΔCoVaR 
 
In this paragraph, we make a brief analysis about the dependent and independent variables that 
are used in the last panel regression (Table 4). 
Since we want to give a more comprehensive understanding about the financial stability, we 
consider also the systemic risk, in particular how a financial institution contributes to the 
systemic risk.  
Our dependent variable is Δ"#$%&, that is a measure of systemic risk, very used in the 
literature. We obtain this measure implementing a code on MATLAB. 
 
Bank specific and macroeconomic financial stability determinants:  
 
§ Bank stability (Z-SCORE): clearly, the relationship that we expect between systemic risk 
and bank stability is negative. If the systemic risk increases, this situation leads to a decrease 
in Z-score since higher values of Z-score indicates greater banking stability.   
 
§ Bank profitability (ROA): profitability should exhibit a negative relationship with a bank’s 
systemic risk because profitability shields a bank from defaulting. In fact, profitability 
proxies the financial institutions’ ability to generate profits efficiently throughout the 
business cycle.  
 
§ Asset size (SIZE): for this variable we expect a positive relationship since large size implies 
greater systemic risk importance.  
 
§ Credit risk (CRISK): obviously, the relationship that there is between credit risk and 
systemic risk is positive since an increase in the credit risk (i.e. increasing impaired loans) 
indicates an increase in systemic risk. In particular, a bank characterized by lots of impaired 
loans gives a great contribution to the systemic risk.  
 
§ Income diversification (DIV): in this case, the relationship that we expect is positive, since 
an increase in the income diversification level and in the non-traditional activities (i.e. 




§ Value at Risk (VaR): the VaR of a bank, i.e. idiosyncratic risk of a bank, contributes 
positively to the systemic risk. Since when there is an increase in the idiosyncratic risk this 
generates as a consequence an increase in the systemic risk, contributing to get worse the 
financial situation and position of a bank.  
 
§ Capital adequacy (EA): the sign that we expect is negative due to the fact that the systemic 
risk is lower for bank that are well-capitalized i.e. higher equity to asset ratios.  
 
§ Gross Domestic product (GDP): obviously, the sign that we want to obtain is negative since 
an increase in the GDP growth rate decrease the systemic risk.  
 
Table 4: Summary of variable selection about financial stability – Δ"#$%& 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
îïñóòô MATLAB code 
 
 
INDIPENDENT VARIABLES DESCRIPTION EXPECTED 
EFFECT 
Z-SCORE (CAR + ROA)/+ROA _ 
BANK PROFITABILITY (ROA) Net income/Total assets _ 
ASSET SIZE (SIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets + 
CREDIT RISK (CRISK) Impaired loans/Gross loans + 
INCOME DIVERSIFICATION (DIV) 1-(NETs2 + NIIs2) + 
VALUE AT RISK (VaR) MATLAB code + 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY (EA) Total equity/Total assets _ 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) Annual real GDP growth rate  _ 










4.1.4. Empirical models 
 
Based on the past empirical studies, we develop our panel data models to examine the impact 
of bank internal variables and macroeconomic variables on its profitability and stability.  
To test the relationship between bank profitability and bank-specific determinants and 
macroeconomic determinants described before, we use a linear regression model. The feedback 
from the literature on bank profitability and financial stability reveals that the functional linear 
form of analysis is the proper one.  
Therefore, a multivariate analysis is carried out to verify the hypothesis of this study and panel 
regression techniques are used to investigate the internal and external determinants. We select 
panel data because they allow to measure respectively individual variability and dynamic 
change of the cross-section units over time.  
To examine the determinants (i.e. internal and external) of bank profitability and financial 
stability of Italian banks, we estimate a linear regression model of the following form:  
 
l$C = 8 + Ñ-.$C
- + Ñ:.$C
: + M$C																			(1) 
 
where i refers to an individual bank; t refers to year; l$C refers to the profitability of the bank 
for the first part of the analysis and then to the financial stability for the second and third one; 
.$C
- represents the internal determinants (bank-specific variables) and .$C:  stands for the external 
variables (macroeconomic variables);  M$C is a normally distributed random variable disturbance 
term (error term).  
 
Extending equation (1) to reflect the variables considered in the studies, the regression models 
are formulated in the following way:  
 
&('$C = 8 +	Ñ0<_5)$C + Ñ;P"_?1$C10 + ÑE=_$$C + ÑF)'$C + ÑG"&_<â_?1$C10
+ ÑM=)I(<_ä$C + ÑNõ=I$C + ÑO_@P$C
+ M$C																																																																																																																																(2) 
 
5 − <"(&)$C = 8 + Ñ0&('$C + Ñ;<_5)$C + ÑEP&_<â_?1$C10 + ÑF=_$_?1$C10




Δ"#$%&$C = Ñ05<"(&)$C + Ñ;&('$C + ÑE<_5)$C + ÑF"&_<â$C + ÑG=_$$C + ÑM$%&$C
+ ÑN)'$C + ÑOõ=I_?1$C10 + M$C																																																																													(4) 
 
For the first regression model, l$C is the profitability of bank i at time t. We can consider two 
indicators, namely, ROE and ROA, represent two alternative performance measures for the 
bank i during the period t. For our analysis, we make all the evaluation on the estimates through 
the return on assets (ROA), following the majority of the literature.  
Then, for the second regression model, l$C stands for the financial stability at individual level. 
We analyze the bank stability through the Z-score measure, which captures the individual 
dimension.  
Finally, in the last regression, l$C represents the systemic risk, measured by ∆"#$%&, which 
captures the contribution of an individual institution to the systemic risk.  
To make a more comprehensive analysis, these three models are evaluated and tested 
separately. The software used for our empirical analysis are STATA and MATLAB. 
 
4.2. Bank profitability analysis  
 
4.2.1. Descriptive statistics  
 
The data are collected in annual frequency and they are provided by consolidated annual reports 
of each bank, where it is possible; in addition, we collected data from Bankscope and Thomson 
Reuters DataStream, over the time window going from 2006 to 2019. The choice of the period 
is strictly related to the crisis that affect the Italian banking system during that years.  
Before carrying out the empirical analysis, a summary of descriptive statistics is presented and 
the correlation matrix between variables is checked in the following tables (Table 5 and Table 
6); in details the number of observations varies since our panel dataset is unbalanced.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics – bank profitability analysis 
VARIABLE Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
ROA 265 .3187452 1.831504 -12.26301 18.25786 
SIZE 265 17.13726 1.847532 12.80833 20.75781 
FC_L1 253 4.730832 12.72606 -.4465006 162.0623 
DIV 234 .4462044 .0771719 .1162139 .499999983 
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EA 265 8.443781 5.05377 1.249937 47.23644 
CRISK_L1 251 10.32112 9.57889 .05 60.07 
DEPOSIT 258 46.351 16.53837 4.17096 86.95955 
GDP 266 -.0381429 1.998181 -5.28 1.791 
INF 266 1.415714 1.06074 -.09 3.35 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The average value of ROA (in percentage terms) is a sign that banks suffered in terms of 
profitability during the financial distress reaching negative values; whereas the variable 
CRISK_L1, that captures the ratio between impaired loans and gross loans, is equal to 10,32%, 
with maximum level of 60.07%, a percentage that suggests quite high levels of impaired assets.  
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables – bank profitability analysis 
 SIZE FC_L1 DIV EA CRISK_L1 DEPOSIT GDP INF 
SIZE 1.0000        
FC_L1 -0.1071 1.0000       
DIV 0.5296 0.0538 1.0000      
EA -0.3996 0.0787 -0.3073 1.0000     
CRISK_L1 -0.0067 -0.1727 -0.0214 -0.1600 1.0000    
DEPOSIT -0.1551 -0.3577 0.0572 -0.1365 0.3284 1.0000   
GDP -0.0474 -0.2954 -0.0831 0.1123 0.1913 0.0784 1.0000  
INF -0.0383 0.0697 -0.1293 -0.0239 -0.3962 -0.2419 -0.1259 1.0000 
Source: own elaboration 
 
This table provides information on the degree of correlation between the explanatory variables 
used in the multivariate regression analysis.  
The matrix shows that in general the correlation between the bank-specific variables is not 
strong suggesting that multicollinearity problems are either not severe or non-existent.  
Kennedy (2008) points out that multicollinearity is a problem when the correlation is above 
0.80, which is not the case here.  
Even if the Pearson’s correlation coefficient provides an easy way to detect the presence and 
the severity of multicollinearity, it is not widely recommended for quantification of it because 
of its possible misleading results when, for instance, there is not much historic data or it cannot 
distinguish dependent from explanatory variables.  
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To overcome such drawbacks and verify the presence of the abovementioned problems we run 
a test to verify the goodness of our variables and we compute the VIF (variance inflation factor) 
of each predictor, with the help of the software STATA.  
The VIF may be calculated for each predictor by doing a linear regression of that predictor on 







This index measures how much variance of an estimated regression coefficient increases 
because of collinearity, with respect to the absence of correlation: relatively low VIF size that 
we have obtained demonstrates that we can continue with our analysis and exclude the presence 
of high magnitude multicollinearity.  
According to the rule of thumb, a VIF of 5 or above is considered enough to ascertain the 
presence of multicollinearity problems.  
 
Table 7: Variance Inflation Factor – bank profitability analysis 
VARIABLE VIF 1/VIF 
SIZE 1.76 0.566648 
DIV  1.55 0.646893 
  DEPOSIT  1.47 0.681598 
CRISK_L1 1.37 0.730878 
FC_L1 1.36 0.737339 
EA 1.34 0.746831 
INF 1.27 0.785429 
GDP 1.16 0.859635 
MEAN VIF 1.41  
Source: own elaboration 
 
As we can highlight from the Table 7, in our case values do not exceed 1.76, leaving out the 




4.2.2. Regression analysis  
 
To study the aforementioned phenomenon, the baseline regression equation is the following:  
 
&('$C = 8 +	Ñ0<_5)$C + Ñ;P"_?1$C10 + ÑE=_$$C + ÑF)'$C + ÑG"&_<â_?1$C10
+ ÑM=)I(<_ä$C + ÑNõ=I$C + ÑO_@P$C + M$C			 
 
where the error term M$C can be intended as the sum of two components: M$C = %$ + ü$C. 
The error term captures all the unobserved aspects of the dependent variable that are not 
explained by the regressors introduced in the model. As it can be easily noticed, the term %$ 
does not have t subscript, meaning that it captures time-constant factors and it is referred to as 
fixed effects or unobserved heterogeneity, because it remains constant over time and only 
changes at cross-sectional level, among banks. The term ü$C, instead, is often called 
idiosyncratic error or time-varying error because it captures unobserved factors that change 
over time. 
 
The objective of the research question is to stress out the impact that bank specific and 
macroeconomic factors have upon the profitability of the banks that operate in Italy. 
To study this analysis, we apply a panel regression approach in order to examine the 
determinants of bank profitability, evaluating the impact that each factor or determinant have 
upon them. 
The data of our sample have been taken in the form of unbalanced panel data, in which there 
are some missing observations due to the availability of data, collected on yearly frequency.  
In the next pages, we firstly infer the coefficients using the pooled OLS method, the Fixed 
Effect and the Random Effect models: the comparison of these three sets of estimates is helpful 
in detecting the characteristics of potential bias. The results are summarized in Table 8, that 
compares three estimation techniques used.3  
 
Table 8: Summary of coefficient estimates and related significance level – bank profitability analysis 






FC_L1 -.0005259 -.0002902 -.0008419 
 
 





































CONSTANT -1.163936 -18.23972 -2.309202 
OBSERVATIONS 221 221 221 
R-SQUARED 0.4286 0.4556 0.4201 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The first column of Table 8 reports the pooled Ordinary Least Square estimates, the simplest 
method of estimation employed in a panel data analysis. 
The pooled OLS technique gave us the hoped results, confirming most of the expected 
relationships. The goodness of the model is also confirmed by the R-squared and adjusted R-
squared coefficients which stand to an acceptable level of 0.4286 and 0.4071, demonstrating 
that most of the variance of return on assets (ROA) is explained by the independent variables.  
According to pooled OLS estimates, the statistically significant variables are income 
diversification (DIV), capital adequacy (EA), credit risk (CRISK_L1) and gross domestic 
product (GDP) that are significant at 1% and 5% significance level, as their p-values are lower 
than 0.01 and 0.05; indeed, their t-statistic absolute values are higher than 2.58 and/or 1.96 and 
lower than -2.58 and/or -1.96, further confirming the results. Finally, also the inflation (INF) is 
statistically significant at 10% significance level.  
Although it is useful to compute pooled estimates because they provide a helpful guideline for 
further and more complex investigations, this technique is based on assumptions that rarely 
hold, thus it is generally agreed that the likelihood of valid results is quite small, as they do not 
take into account the serial correlation in the composite errors and they are biased given that 
the unobserved effects are left entirely in the error term.  
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In the second column of the Table 8 we have introduced and analysed the fixed effect model, 
which helps to eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity or time-invariant component, %$, in the 
model because it contains these unobservable error correlated with .$C. 
In other words, it is designed to study causes of changes within the bank, eliminating 
characteristics that are constant for each unit.  
The implementation of the fixed effect model implies some assumption to be taken into 
account: 
v "#q(ü$C , ü$Q|.$ , %$) = 0, that rules out the possibility the idiosyncratic errors could be 
correlated with each value of explanatory variables; 
v "#q(%$; .$C) ≠ 0, meaning that the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with .$C. 
 
In this regard, the Fixed Effect model removes such errors through a fixed effect transformation 
which subtracts the average of the variable within each cross-sectional observation and sweeps 
away %$, then gets a pooled OLS unbiased estimator, also called within estimator (i.e. it differs 
from the between estimator because the latter is obtained using the time averages for each 
variable and then carry out a cross-sectional regression (Wooldridge, 2012)). 
As it is possible to notice from the Table 8 (second column), the return on assets of banks is 
well explained by the predictor variables, in fact according to R-squared within coefficient, it 
is equal to 45.56%. 
The Fixed Effects model yields consistent variables: the statistically significant regressors are 
asset size (SIZE), capital adequacy (EA), credit risk (CRISK_L1), gross domestic product 
(GDP) and inflation (INF).  
According to the Table 8, all coefficients are different from zero highlighting the significance 
of the model, however the same result can be obtained through a joint F-test on regressors, 
which is useful to assess if all the coefficients are jointly different from zero under the 
alternative hypothesis. The outcome provided by the table obtained from STATA is the 
following: 
 
P(8,195) = 20.40										I9#J > P = 0.0000 
 
thus, it indicates the significance of the model estimates.   
 
Unlike the Fixed Effects model, by estimating the same regression using the Random Effects 
model it is possible to investigate time-invariant components embedded in the dependent 
variable.  
 82 
Finally, for this reason, in the third column we implement the Random Effects model. In this 
model the correlation assumption between the fixed effects and the control variables, 
cornerstone of the previously analysed model, does not hold anymore, since the unobserved 
heterogeneity follows a random walk and it is now considered a random variable where 
"#q(%$; .$C) = 0. More in details, the random effects transformation subtracts a fraction of 
time average from the corresponding variable, and not the entire average as occurs in FE model; 
this fraction hinges on errors variance and the number of time periods considered. In this case, 
the unobserved effects are partially left in the error term, as similarly done in pooled OLS. 
Nonetheless, the pooled OLS estimator still remains a biased estimator, unable to predict the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables, due to autoregressive serial 
correlation issues; a generalized least squares estimator, also called random effect estimator 
better features such relationships to deal with this problem.  
As we can notice from the Table 8 (third column), the information provided is quite consistent 
with the results borne by the previous model. The R-squared is high enough, equals to 42.01%. 
The statistically significant variables are capital adequacy (EA), credit risk (CRISK_L1), gross 
domestic product (GDP) and inflation (INF).  
 
After this quick synthesis of the main results provided by each estimation technique, it is now 
crucial to figure out which one of the panel data methods used  in the previous analysis has the 
greatest goodness of fit, able to draw a suitable picture of the effects of certain determinants on 
bank profitability.  
To do this, we need to run a series of tests to identify the most appropriate inferences like the 
Hausman test that establishes the best model between Fixed Effects and Random Effects models 
and the Breusch-Pagan test which compares pooled OLS with Random Effects model.  
 
1. HAUSMAN TEST: In 1978, Jerry A. Hausman has been the first to propose a test 
computing the statistically significant differences in estimated coefficients of both the 
fixed and random effects models.  
The Hausman test remains a fundamental and powerful tool to evaluate which one of 
the implemented models is the most fitting one. The Fixed Effect model assumes that 
influence of independent variables on the dependent one is the same for all units in the 
panel, whereas the Random Effect model is built around the assumption that individual 
effect is a random variable.  
The null hypothesis states that the preferred model is the Random Effects versus the 
alternative which is the Fixed Effects. In other words:  
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§D: "#q(%$; .$C) = 0 
§0: "#q(%$; .$C) ≠ 0 
 
Essentially, if the Hausman test leads us to reject the null hypothesis, it means that RE 
and FE estimates are sufficiently close and their differences are negligible, thus the 
model with the greatest goodness is the Fixed Effects. Conversely, if we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis, the RE is deemed to be the most suitable.  
The Table 9 shows the results:  
 
Table 9: Hausman test – bank profitability analysis  
 
 
Source: own elaboration  
 
According to the results, we got a p-value equal to 0.0000, which indicates that we have 
to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the Fixed Effects model is, indeed, 
appropriate for our analysis.  
 
2. BREUSCH AND PAGAN TEST: To make sure that we can completely exclude pooled 
OLS estimates from our analysis, we decided to perform another test, the Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test.  
This type of test was developed to check for heteroskedasticity in a linear regression 
model. The evidence in favour of heteroskedasticity, in facts, detects that the assumption 
over the constant variance of errors does not hold.  
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We have run the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test to determine if to use 
the pooled OLS or the random effects model. In the LM test the null hypothesis supports 
the goodness of pooled OLS technique and assumes variances across entities to be equal 
to zero, Var(u)=0. In other words, there are no significant differences across units and, 
as a result, the panel effect appears to be negligible, without the need to carry out a panel 
data analysis.  
The test outcome is the following one: 
 
Table 10: Breusch and Pagan test – bank profitability analysis  
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
According to the results showed in Table 10, which bears p-value equal to 0.0000, we 
are led to reject the null hypothesis, confirming the presence of a panel effect that makes 
the Random Effect model the most suitable between the two involved in the test.  
 
 
The final outcome of our analysis about the bank profitability have led us to conclude that the 
Fixed Effects model is the most fitting and appropriate to capture the main issues we wanted to 
investigate. In light of this analysis, it is necessary to attribute an economic meaning to the 
obtained coefficients.  
This study uses return on assets (ROA) to proxy bank profitability. Then, we proceed our 
profitability model using Fixed Effects (FE) model.  
The results for each independent variable, and their economic implications, according to the 
Fixed Effects model, are reported below:  
 
v <_5)$C: as we have already seen, generally the effect of a growing size on profitability has 
been proved to be positive to a certain extent. In fact, the estimated coefficient is positive, 
the estimate is statistically significant at 1% significance level. The positive sign describes 
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a situation in which increasing bank size can increase profitability by allowing banks to 
realize economies of scale. Moreover, larger banks are likely to have a higher degree of 
product and loan diversification than smaller ones. 
 
v P"_?1$C10: as highlighted from the literature review, there is a negative relationship 
between funding costs and bank profitability.  
For our analysis we implement the lagged value of funding cost to explain better how the 
costs accumulated over time could affect the performance of a financial institution.  
Banks have to pay interests on their deposits. These funding costs, which we define as 
interest expenses over customer deposits, vary across banks and over time. Overall, what 
we initially expected is confirmed, banks that are able to raise funds more cheaply than 
others are considered more profitable.  
In the Italian banking system, it is worth noting that since 2009, the ratio of interest expenses 
to customer deposit declined, one the one hand because the banks failed to attract sufficient 
liquidity to depositors, on the other hand as a result of the central bank’s monetary policy, 
reflected in progressively lowering the monetary policy rate.  
 
v =_$$C: the empirical results reflect a positive statistically insignificant relationship. As 
confirmed in the work by Chiorazzo, Milani and Salvini (2008), income diversification 
increases returns. As highlighted in Chapter 2, lots of changes occurred in the banks’ 
business lines that had a substantial impact on the structure of bank income and 
composition. The shift toward non-interest revenues is undisputedly recognized as one of 
the most important factors behind the recovery of Italian banks’ profitability.   
 
v )'$C: the coefficient of the ratio of total equity to total asset is positive and statistically 
significant, expressing a direct relationship with the bank’s profitability. As outlined above, 
the capital adequacy ratio is a measure of bank risk and may have an a priori ambiguous 
effect on bank profitability, given that there are opposite effects at work. In our case, the 
negative risk effect seems to be over-compensated by the positive safety aspect.  
Better capitalized banks are safer compared to those with lower capital ratios and may face 
lower costs of funding due to lower prospective bankruptcy costs. Moreover, banks with 
higher equity-to-asset ratio normally have a reduced need for external funding, which has 
again a positive effect on bank profitability.  
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v "&_<â_?1$C10: as it is clearly intuitive, the empirical results confirm our expectations; the 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 1% significance level. As made for the 
funding cost variable, only for these two variables we consider the lagged value since it is 
more significant understand how the effects of accumulated impaired loans over the years 
affect the bank profitability of a financial institution.  
This shows that banks with a high credit risk present more reduced profitability levels. The 
deep and prolonged recession that has hit the Italian economy and lengthy credit  recovery 
procedures have contributed to the high volume of impaired loans in the Italian banking 
system.  
The level of NPL ratios varies widely across the Euro area, but it remains at rather elevated 
levels in the majority of countries that were most affected by the financial crisis and this 
may have constrained credit origination in these countries. The Italian banking system 
appears to be the one most affected by the phenomenon of NPLs. The share of gross NPLs 
for the main Italian banking groups was 16.8%, compared with a European average of 5.8% 
(Bank of Italy, 2015).  
 
 
v =)I(<_ä$C: this variable has an insignificant and negative impact on bank profitability. 
This result does not respect our expectations, but we will see later on after implementing 
some robustness tests that this variable becomes positive as we want.   
 
v õ=I$C: this variable is an important determinant of the bank profitability, the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant, which means that banks profits in this country usually 
increase in prosperous economic times. International crisis, deteriorating domestic and 
international economic environment, declining growth have, naturally, a significant 
negative impact on the profitability of Italian banks. During and after the Great Financial 
Crises and Sovereign Debt Crises, the GDP growth rate suffered a great decline.  
 
 
v _@P$C: as mentioned before the effects of the inflation upon the bank’s profitability depend 
on the capacity of the bank management to forecast the inflation. Our findings reflect, in 
accordance with the theory that at the level of the banks analyzed, the inflation is not 
anticipated, so the effect of the inflation upon the banking profitability is negative.  
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4.2.3. Other diagnostic tests 
 Now, we go further into the analysis and perform some diagnostic tests to better determine the 
significance of the Fixed Effects model.  
 
 
v WOOLDRIDGE TEST FOR AUTOCORRELATION: To check on serial correlation, 
namely the correlation between an error and the lagged version of itself in our panel dataset 
that can cause less efficient estimates, we run the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in 
panel data, under the null hypothesis §D: no first-order autocorrelation, and the results are 
the following:  
P(1, 16) = 0.597 
I9#J > P = 0.4511 
 
With these results we have to accept the null hypothesis (i.e. §D: no first-order 
autocorrelation). Then, to make a more complete analysis, we think it would be better to 
further investigate the goodness of Fixed Effects model. 
 
v MODIFIED WALD TEST: We have already performed the Breusch-Pagan test to check 
on whether the error term variance was constant or not and we ended up with rejecting the 
null hypothesis, thus identifying a non-constant variance. To be more sure about the 
outcome, we performed the Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity in fixed 
effect regression model and since the p-value is smaller than 0.05 we reject the null 
hypothesis (§D: +$; = +; for all i) and confirm the heteroskedasticity presence.  
 
The previous diagnostic tests have brought heteroskedasticity issues that cannot be ignored. In 
fact, in this case, the Fixed Effects model yields some shortcoming that could make the 
coefficient estimates not consistent.  
To bypass such problems, many authors proposed different approaches, like the Feasible 
Generalized Least Square (FGLS) methods by Parks-Kmenta, or the Panel-Corrected Standard 
Errors (PCSE) by Beck and Katz, with the final aim of ensuring valid statistical inference.  
The characteristics of our dataset have taken us to exclude the first approach since it is typically 
unfeasible for panels where the cross-sectional dimension N is larger than the time dimension 
T. It is for this reason that we rely on the regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE) method which well performs with small panels. This technique is useful when we need 
to solve this shortcoming of heteroskedasticity (imposing no autocorrelation resulted from the 
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Wooldridge test), getting consistent and unbiased estimators4. The results are summarized in 
the following Table 11: 
 



















Source: own elaboration 
 
The results, computed using the PCSE method, are similar to previously discussed findings. 
The most significant variables are the income diversification (DIV), the capital adequacy (EA), 
the credit risk (CRISK_L1), the gross domestic product (GDP) and the inflation (INF). All of 
them are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.  
In conclusion, the new modified model moderately changes the initial findings despite it does 
not introduce prominent differences. The most significant change concerns the sign of deposits 
that becomes positive as we initially expected. This is expected, since banks normally should 





4 We have also performed the robust standard errors (through “vce robust command”) in order to solve the 
heteroskedasticity problem, the results obtained are quite similar to these ones.  
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4.3. Financial stability analysis – Z-score  
 
4.3.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
As we have highlighted in the previous Chapters, in this part we explain the role of financial 
stability focusing on the individual institution level.  
Next, in the following section, since we want to make a more comprehensive analysis about 
financial stability, we will evidence also the role of systemic risk, i.e. how a single institution 
contributes to the risk at the system level.  
Following the empirical analysis made before, we report the summary statistics of both 
dependent and independent variables used in our model. This shows observations, mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum of our sample data.   
In this analysis our dependent variable is the Z-score than stands for a proxy of bank stability 
at individual level.  
 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics – financial stability analysis Z-score 
VARIABLE Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Z-SCORE 265 14.24606 10.14261 -2.184338 41.34451 
ROA 265 .3187452 1.831504 -12.26301 18.25786 
SIZE 265 17.13726 1.847532 12.80833 20.75781 
FRISK_L1 257 8.02434 3.810505 .4051578 16.8284 
DIV_L1 233 .4459775 .0772598 .1162139 .499999983 
CRISK 252 10.31262 9.560741 .05 60.07 
EA 265 8.443781 5.05377 1.249937 47.23644 
LOAN 258 61.93601 19.1941 9.025341 96.74909 
GDP 266 -.0381429 1.998181 -5.28 1.791 
INF 266 1.415714 1.06074 -.09 3.35 
Source: own elaboration 
 
After showing the descriptive statistics in the Table 12, it is useful to provide information on 
the degree of correlation between the independent variables that are implemented in the 




Table 13: Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables – financial stability analysis Z-score 
 ROA SIZE FRISK_L1 DIV_L1 CRISK EA LOAN GDP INF 
ROA 1.0000         
SIZE -0.0459 1.0000        
FRISK_L1 -0.0707 0.3670 1.0000       
DIV_L1 0.1767 0.5099 0.1986 1.0000      
CRISK -0.4129 0.0242 0.0262 0.0804 1.0000     
EA 0.3062 -0.3192 -0.2725 -0.0881 -0.0348 1.0000    
LOAN 0.0643 0.2137 0.2524 0.3719 0.0876 0.0480 1.0000   
GDP 0.0470 -0.0263 0.0953 0.1490 0.0543 0.1058 -0.0128 1.0000  
INF 0.0501 -0.0457 -0.0730 -0.0310 -0.3772 -0.0966 0.0319 -0.1414 1.0000 
Source: own elaboration 
 
From the results obtained in the Table 13, we can show that there is no evidence of 
multicollinearity since the problem arises when the correlation is above 0.80.  
To confirm our empirical results, we run a test to verify the goodness of our variables and we 
compute the VIF (variance inflation factor) of each predictor, through the software STATA.  
As we have previously stated, a VIF of 5 or above is considered enough to demonstrate the 
existence of multicollinearity problems.  
 
Table 14: Variance Inflation Factor – financial stability analysis Z-score 
VARIABLE VIF 1/VIF 
DIV_L1  1.69 0.590639 
SIZE  1.66 0.603967 
CRISK 1.51 0.662215 
ROA 1.48 0.675856 
EA 1.35 0.743093 
FRISK_L1 1.30 0.771712 
LOAN 1.27 0.787559 
INF 1.24 0.803414 
GDP 1.09 0.914891 
MEAN VIF 1.40  
Source: own elaboration 
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From the Table 14, it is possible to shed light on the fact that our values do not exceed 1.69, so 
we can conclude that there is no possibility of potential biased estimator due to such 
problematic.  
 
4.3.2. Regression analysis 
 
Our regression equation is structured in the following way: 
 
5 − <"(&)$C = 8 + Ñ0&('$C + Ñ;<_5)$C + ÑEP&_<â_?1$C10 + ÑF=_$_?1$C10
+ ÑG"&_<â$C	+	ÑM)'$C	+	ÑN?('@$C + ÑOõ=I$C + ÑP_@P$C + M$C					 
 
The main aim of this second analysis is to point out the impact that certain bank specific 
determinants and macroeconomic factors have upon the financial stability, at individual bank 
level.  
Going through the analysis made for bank profitability, we apply again a panel regression 
approach in order to analyse the determinants of financial stability. 
Also in this panel regression, the data have been taken in form of unbalanced panel data, 
collected on yearly frequency.  
In the following part, we first determine the coefficients using the pooled OLS method, then 
the fixed effect and random effect models. The results are indicated in the Table 15, that 
compares these three different estimation techniques.  
 
Table 15: Summary of coefficient estimates and related significance level – financial stability analysis Z-score 
































LOAN .1997827 -.0619965 -.0497664 
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CONSTANT 9.998074 42.21372 31.46367 
OBSERVATIONS 224 224 224 
R-SQUARED 0.3453 0.6375 0.6345 
Source: own elaboration 
 
As we have already seen, the first column reports the pooled OLS estimates, that it the simplest 
method estimation used in a panel data analysis.   
The results obtained with this technique confirm some of the expected relationships. According 
to this method, the statistically significant variables at 1% significance level are funding risk 
(FRISK_L1), credit risk (CRISK) and loans share (LOAN), instead return on assets (ROA) and 
assets size (SIZE) are significant at 5% significance level, finally the inflation (INF) is 
significant at 10% significance level. In fact, their p-values are lower than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
respectively; moreover, their t-statistic absolute values are higher than 2.58, 1.96 and 1.65 or 
lower than -2.58, -1.96 and -1.65 confirming our estimates.  
 
In the second column of the Table 15 we have considered the fixed effect model. As it is 
possible to show from the Table above, the Z-score that represents bank stability is explained 
very well by the predictor variables. In fact, R-squared within coefficient is equal to 63.75%. 
In this analysis, the statistically significant regressors at 1% significance level are return on 
assets (ROA), assets size (SIZE), income diversification (DIV_L1), capital adequacy (EA) and 
loans share (LOAN).  
All the coefficients analysed are different from zero emphasizing the significance of the model, 
anyway the same result can be achieved through a joint F-test on regressors. The outcome given 
by STATA is the following: 
 
P(9,197) = 38.49.									I9#J > P = 0.0000 
 
which shows the significance of the model estimates.   
 
Finally, in the third column it is possible to implement the Random Effects model through 
which it is possible to investigate time-invariant components embedded in the dependent 
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variables. Analysing the Table 15 (third column), the information provided is quite similar with 
the results borne by the previous model. As it can be easily noticed, the Z-score is again well 
explained by the predictor variables, as 63.45% of total sample variation is caught by the model, 
according to the R-squared coefficient.  
The statistically significant variables are the same obtained from the fixed effects: return on 
assets (ROA), asset size (SIZE), income diversification (DIV_L1), capital adequacy (EA) and 
loans share (LOAN). 
 
After making this brief analysis of the main results obtained from each technique, we have to 
make the same tests used in the bank profitability analysis.  
We need to make some tests in order to identify the most appropriate inferences like the 
Hausman test that determines the best model between Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
models and then the Breusch-Pagan test which compares pooled OLS with Random Effects 
model.  
 
1. HAUSMAN TEST: The null hypothesis states that the preferred model is Random 
Effects versus the alternative which is the Fixed Effects.  
If the Hausman test leads us to reject the null hypothesis, we have to choose the Fixed 
Effects models, on the contrary if we fail to reject the null, the RE is deemed to be the 
most suitable.  
 
Table 16: Hausman test – financial stability analysis Z-score  
 
Source: own elaboration 
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Also in this case, looking Table 16, since our p-value is lower than 0.05 we have to 
reject the null hypothesis and for this reason the Fixed Effects model is the most suitable 
for our analysis.  
 
2. BREUSCH-PAGAN TEST: again in this case, in order to make sure that we can 
completely exclude pooled OLS estimates from our analysis, we decided to perform the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test. We have to run this test to determine if to 
use the pooled OLS or the random effects model. The null supports the goodness of the 
pooled OLS method. The result is the following: 
 
Table 17: Breusch and Pagan test – financial stability analysis Z-score  
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
According to the results showed in the Table 17, with p-value equal to 0.0000, we have 
to reject the null hypothesis, confirming in this way the presence of a panel effect that 
makes the Random Effect model the most suitable between the two considered in the 
test.  
 
Concluding, we can say that our analysis about financial stability at individual level have driven 
us to choose the Fixed Effects model as the most fitting and appropriate to capture the main 
issues we wanted to investigate. This study uses Z-score to proxy bank stability at individual 
level. Then, we continue our analysis using Fixed Effect (FE) model.  
The economic implications of each variable are explained below: 
 
v &('$C: as expected, we found a positive relationship between bank profitability and 
stability. As the financial stability of a bank increases, this reflects a positive movement 
into its bank profitability. This is understandable because, all things being equal, increasing 
profits would mean more funds for the bank to meet contingencies. High profitability has 
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been linked to high stability in the banking industry because if profits do not flow out to 
shareholders as dividends, they become part of equity capital which strengthen the capital 
base of the banks leading to an improvement in bank stability.  
This relationship is clearly intuitive and significant at 1% significance level, highlighting 
the importance and interconnection that there is between bank profitability and financial 
stability, which is one of the main goals of this analysis.  
 
v <_5)$C: for what concerned this variable, past literature is limited to determine the size-
stability relationship. Some studies report a negative relationship between them; on the 
other hand, others found a positive effect of bank size on stability. According to Table 15 
(second column), our analysis suggests that bank size has a negative and significant impact 
on stability, which is supported by the assumptions of agency theory (bank size has an 
adverse effect on stability). 
 
v P&_<â_?1$C10: our estimates indicate a negative and insignificant relationship between 
funding risk and stability, that does not respect our expectations. This result will change 
after running the diagnostic tests.  
In order to develop a more significant model, we need to lag this variable and capture its 
importance in the previous years.  
 
v =_$_?1$C10: also for this variable, we have used its lagged value, since it explains better its 
impact on financial stability. As expected, we obtain a negative and significant coefficient 
of income diversification. 
This is coherent with the results obtained in the first analysis, since higher income 
diversification leads higher bank profitability and returns but at the same time increase the 
volatility of the returns, reducing in this way the bank stability at individual level.  This is 
the classical trade-off analysed in economy between risk and return.  
 
v "&_<â$C: as it is clearly intuitive, the negative relationship confirms what we initially 
expected. Credit risk plays an important role in the financial stability and in the bank’s 
default probability. An increase in the impaired loans leads to a deterioration of the 
individual bank stability. 
 
v )'$C: this ratio is mainly used to assess a company’s financial leverage. The higher the 
equity-to-asset ratio, the less leveraged the company is, meaning that a larger percentage of 
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its assets are owned by the company and its investors. The result shows a positive a 
significant coefficient at 1% significance level, confirming what we expect.   
 
v ?('@$C: the result of this coefficient follows what we expect, it is negative and statistically 
significant at 1% significance level. In fact, the higher the ratio, the riskier a bank may be 
to higher defaults.  
 
v õ=I$C: this sign is aligned with our expectation, the relationship is insignificant but positive. 
Clearly, an increase in the GDP growth rate leads to an increase in the bank stability, these 
two variables are necessarily directly proportional.  
 
v _@P$C: the result shows a negative and insignificant relationship between bank stability at 
individual level and inflation rate. 
 
4.3.3. Other diagnostic tests 
 
As previously done, we go further in the analysis and perform some diagnostic tests to better 
estimate the significance of the Fixed Effects model, which is the most appropriate in our 
analysis.  
 
v WOOLDRIDGE TEST FOR AUTOCORRELATION: To check on serial correlation, 
we run Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data, under the null hypothesis §D: no 
first-order autocorrelation, and the results are the following: 
 
P(1,17) = 24.345 
I9#J > P = 0.0001 
 
With these results we have to reject the null hypothesis. As a consequence, we think it would 
be better to further investigate the goodness of Fixed Effects model, in order to be sure that 
serial correlation does not produce considerably different estimates change.  
 
v MODIFIED WALD TEST: As previously done, in order to check for heteroskedasticity, 
we need to implement the modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity in Fixed 
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Effects regression model. The resulting p-value is 0.0000 which reject the null hypothesis 
since is lower than 0.05 and confirms the presence of heteroskedasticity problem.  
 
 
The previous diagnostic tests have brought autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity issued that 
cannot be erroneously ignored. In order to correct these shortcomings of the Fixed Effects 
model, we implement the Prais-Winsten regression (PCSE) which well performs with small 
panels. This technique is useful when a certain degree of correlation and heteroskedasticity is 
ascertained. The results are summarized in the following Table 18: 
 



















Source: own elaboration 
 
Also in this case, we can highlight that the results obtained using the PCSE method are quite 
similar to what we have obtained in the previous analysis. 
The R-squared equal to 66.24% shows a high degree of variability explained by the model.  
The most significant variables are return on assets (ROA), assets size (SIZE), funding risk 
(FRISK_L1), income diversification (DIV_L1), credit risk (CRISK), capital adequacy (EA) 
and loans share (LOAN).  
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The most important change concerns the sign of funding risk, which now is corrected with our 
initial expectation.  
The coefficient of funding risk (FRISK_L1) is become significant but no longer negative, 
confirming our expectations. The positive relationship submits that customer deposits are 
efficiently mobilized by the banks in Italy to attain higher stability. The implication is that a 
bank that shows consistency in its effective deposit mobilization strategy is more likely to be 
stable than its counterparts.  
 
Concluding, the new modified model moderately changes the initial findings despite it does not 



























4.4. Financial stability analysis – Δ"#$%& 
 
4.4.1. Δ"#$%& estimation  
 
Before concluding our empirical research with the last multivariate regression model focusing 
on the financial stability at system level, we need to determine our systemic measure Δ"#$%&.  
 
Many studies have been carried out by several researchers trying to measure the transmittable 
effect of a single firm distress situation to the system and to understand if these measures could 
have predicted the financial crisis and ex-post if they could have been useful to policymakers 
to implement the regulations. 
The definition of Systemic Risk, takes into account not only the risk associated to a single firm, 
but also the risk of the whole economy; Billio et al., (2012) gives a definition for systemic risk, 
which is “any set of circumstances that threatens the stability of or public confidence in the 
financial system”. 
 
Value-at-Risk measures the risk level of an individual institution and does not reflect the risk 
of the financial system as a whole. For this reason it cannot be used for systemic risk analysis. 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) define the CoVaR as systemic risk measure.  
These researchers determine CoVaR to avoid the problems caused by the VaR and attempt to 
catch the single firm contribution to the risk of the financial sector. In the definition of the 
CoVaR “Co” stands for the conditional and sounds like covariance because it is a conditional 
VaR and has different characteristics in common with covariance. In particular, as VaR is 
commensurate to variance, CoVaR is proportional to covariance.  
VaR can be described as the probability of a return to be less than a fixed q quantile of the 
distribution, that is:  
Pro.$ ≤ $%&$
!
p = 4, 
 
where  .$ is the return of the [CI asset and 1 − 4 is the significance level of the VaR. 
 
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), we define with 'C$ = å"C$?C$  the market value of 
the total assets of bank i at time t, where å"C$ is the bank’s market capitalization and ?C$  the 
bank’s asset-to-equity ratio (the leverage ratio). 
We define the growth rate of market valued total assets of bank i using data available in the 










Subscript “sys” denotes the entire financial system, i.e. the set of all the banks in our sample. 
Note that the Italian banking system is well represented by the set of listed banks that includes 
most existing banks. The growth rate of market valued total assets of the financial system .C
QRQ 
is computed as the average market valued asset returns weighted by lagged market valued total 
assets.  
 
CoVaR can be defined as the probability that the return of an institution j is less than the q 
quantile of the distribution conditioned on an event, C, which involves the return of another 
institution i. Note that the institution j can also represent the whole system, as in our case. 
The CoVaR can be written as: 
Pr	(." ≤ "#$%&!
"%&((!)
3"(.$)) = 4 
where ." is the return of ßCI institution, .$ is the return of [CI institution and q is the significance 
level that the researcher fixed.  
Note that q represents the conditional probability that ." is less than CoVaR.  
It does not depend on the strategy of the management of the [CI company. The CoVaR is an 
endogenous risk measure, because it is based on the risk that other institutions take. Since the 
CoVaR is a conditioned measure of the return distribution, it identifies terminal values of the 
tail more extreme than the unconditional tail values found with VaR. 
Considering two institutions i and j, through CoVaR we can measure the spillover effect on the 
institution j caused by an event C that involves the institution i. This outcome could be caused 
by interconnections among institutions, like contractual links or due to the fact that these 
companies have the same stockholders control or the same market target. Note that higher is 
the CoVaR, more is the effect of the institution i on the institution j.  
Evidently it cannot be a symmetric measure, because it is different conditioning an institution 






If we suppose that j is the whole financial system and that the return of the financial institution 
i could be distressed, through CoVaR we will estimate the effect on the whole system of a 
crunch situation of the individual firm. On the other hand, if we suppose that i is the whole 
system and j is the single institution we will obtain the effect on the return of an individual 
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institution caused by a financial system crunch, allowing to sort by the riskiness contribution 
each institution.  
Δ"#$%& is obtained by difference between the CoVaR of an institution j when the i one is 
distressed and the CoVaR of the institution j evaluated when the institution i is on a median 








Δ"#$%& represents the increase in the VaR of each institution j, when there is a crunch in i 
respect to a median situation, i and j could be either individual companies or j could be the 
whole financial system.  
To evaluate CoVaR we will use a quantile approach, instead of other method like time-varying 







V7l7i:H%[W are the expected values of the system of a quantile regression conditioned 
to the institution i.  





















If CoVaR is not constant over time, we have to be able to catch its variation introducing 
externalities that can explain the variability.  
 
Up to now, it is presented a methodology for estimating Δ"#$%& that is constant over time. To 
capture time-variation in the joint distribution of .QRQCB- and .$, we estimate $%&7 and 
Δ"#$%&7 as a function of state variables, allowing in this way to model the evolution of the 
joint distributions over time. Indicating time-varying "#$%&!,C$  and $%&!,C$  with a subscript t, 
and estimate the time variation conditional on a vector of lagged state variables ΜC10.  
Conditional estimates are function of state variables, allowing for time-variation in the risk 
estimates. In order to compute the conditional estimates, we separately regress asset return for 
each bank i and for the system on a number of state variables included in the matrix M for the 
1% quantile. State variables proxy the state of the economy.  
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Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), they estimate the following quantile regressions 
on weekly data (in our code we implement daily data since the code on MATLAB required that 


















The predicted values from the quantile regressions correspond to the VaR and the CoVaR of 























To assess Δ"#$%& we have firstly to estimate CoVaR. We choose quantile5 regression 
estimation for CoVaR, despite of conditional volatility models such as GARCH, because these 
lasts require several assumptions on return distribution and are difficult to estimate.  
Adrian and Brunnermeier have tested both methods, reached to the conclusion that the results 
of two methods are similar and hence we could consider the quantile approach as a robust 
method to estimate CoVaR. 
Considering that Δ"#$%& is the difference between CoVaR determined in a distress situation 
and the median one, we first evaluate CoVaR of the institution in the median and distress 
situation using the quantile regression.  
 
For this empirical work, we have used the software MATLAB, adapting the code of Tommaso 
Belluzzo that is available online and creating an appropriate dataset for our purpose. 
Bank of Italy has identified UniCredit, Intesa Sanpaolo and Banco BPM banking groups as 
other systematically important institutions (O-SIIs) authorized to operate in Italy in 2019. 
 
Before starting with the empirical analysis, in this part we provide a description of the data 
implemented in the evaluation of Δ"#$%&. We obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream 
 
5 Bassett and Koenker (1978) are the first to derive statistical properties of quantile regressions.  
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some important factors, using a daily frequency (excluding assets and equity data), from 2006 
through 2019: 
 
a. Market capitalizations: focusing on the Italian case, we consider MV of all Italian banks 
taken into account in our sample; 
b. Returns of Italian banks considered in our sample;  
c. Book value of assets and book value of equity with yearly frequency; 
d. Then, similarly to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), a set of state variables (or factors) 
are considered to estimate the Δ"#$%& of Italian banks through the quantile regression 
method: 
• EBF EURIBOR 3M DELAYED stands for the change in the 2-year Italian 
government bond yields to which we refer to as short term yield; 
• the market return, that is the FTSE MIB (Euro Stoxx) Index return, to which we 
refer to as market returns; 
• the equity volatility, that is the implied volatility index on the Euro Stoxx 50, to 
which we refer to as equity volatility; 
• IBOXX Corporate Index includes corporate bonds issued by European 
corporations. We use this index since we could not find a similar specialized on 
the Italian corporate bond market. 
• The short-term EuriborOIS spread, that is the difference between the 3-month 
Euribor rate and 3-month overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate.   
  
The choice of these state variables is made analyzing the literature review about this topic, 










6 We have also tried to consider the VDAX as new volatility index in the stock market and we have obtained quite 
similar results. We have used a German state variable due to the lack of the Italian state variable. This is a 
reasonable assumption due to the spillover effect of Germany on the rest of Europe, in particularly of Italy.  
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Source: own elaboration using MATLAB 
 
 
Moreover, UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo are also considered global systematically important 
banks (GSIBs), as highlighted in the Figure 9.  
Interpreting these figures we read the Δ"#$%& measure as a positive values, in reality the sign 
of Δ"#$%& measure is clearly negative, but the researcher that have created the code changes 
the sign into a positive one only for a better and easy understanding.  
 
4.4.2. Descriptive statistics  
 
In this final section, we complete our analysis of financial stability considering also the 
contribution of an individual financial institution at the system level.  
We start our third empirical analysis with a summary statistics of the main dependent and 
independent variables.  
We estimate our dependent variable with Δ"#$%&, that measures the systemic risk of our 
sample of Italian banks over the time span from 2006 to 2019.  





Table 19: Descriptive statistics – financial stability analysis '"#$%& 
VARIABLE Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
DeltaCoVaR 265 -.0123734 .0059614 -.0336638 -.0011002 
ZSCORE 265 14.24606 10.14261 -2.184338 41.34451 
ROA 265 .3187452 1.831504 -12.26301 18.25786 
SIZE 265 17.13726 1.847532 12.80833 20.75781 
CRISK 252 10.31262 9.560741 .05 60.07 
DIV 236 .442423 .0870914 .1162139 .499999983 
VaR 265 -.0364114 .0129425 -.1128995 -.0132177 
EA 265 8.443781 5.05377 1.249937 47.23644 
GDP_L1 265 -.0394189 2.001853 -5.28 1.791 
Source: own elaboration 
 
As previously made for all the analysis, it is helpful to evaluate the correlation level between 
sets of variables. It can be done with a correlation matrix that uses the Pearson coefficient.  
 
Table 20: Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables – financial stability analysis '"#$%& 
 ZSCORE ROA SIZE CRISK DIV VaR  EA GDP 
ZSCORE 1.0000        
ROA 0.2520 1.0000       
SIZE 0.0558 -0.0456 1.0000      
CRISK -0.2135 -0.4151 0.0298 1.0000     
DIV 0.1906 0.1054 0.5098 0.0526 1.0000    
VaR 0.3161 0.4192 -0.3381 -0.4051 -0.1793 1.0000   
EA 0.0095 0.3076 -0.3601 -0.0559 -0.1786 0.2454 1.0000  
GDP_L1 0.0146 0.0175 -0.0128 -0.0704 -0.0623 -0.1133 0.0644 1.0000 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The Table 20 illustrates that there are some cases of strong, but not perfect, positive or negative 
correlation that might create multicollinearity issues and might produce biased estimators with 
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large standard errors. Even if the Pearson’s correlation coefficient provides an easy way to 
detect the presence and the severity of multicollinearity, we need also to run a test to verify the 
goodness of our variables and we compute the VIF of each predictor, always with the software 
STATA.  
 
Table 21: Variance Inflation Factor – financial stability analysis '"#$%& 
VARIABLE VIF 1/VIF 
SIZE 1.72 0.579873 
VaR 1.63 0.612725 
CRISK 1.55 0.646113 
ROA 1.47 0.680868 
DIV 1.38 0.723645 
EA 1.29 0.773749 
ZSCORE 1.22 0.819441 
GDP_L1 1.06 0.940203 
Mean VIF 1.42  
Source: own elaboration 
 
As we can see in the Table 21, values do not exceed 1.72, leaving out the possibility of potential 
biased estimators due to such problematic.  
 
4.4.3. Regression analysis 
 
To study the aforementioned phenomenon, the baseline multivariate regression equation is the 
following one: 
 
Δ"#$%&$C = Ñ05<"(&)$C + Ñ;&('$C + ÑE<_5)$C + ÑF"&_<â$C + ÑG=_$$C + ÑM$%&$C
+ ÑN)'$C + ÑOõ=I_?1$C10 + M$C 
 
We implement a panel regression analysis in which the individual bank i’s contribution to 
systemic risk in year t is regressed on the independent variables.  
After making the same analysis performed previously: pooled OLS, Fixed and Random Effects 
models, then Hausman and Breusch-Pagan test, we carry out a number of robustness tests to 
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better infer the most fitting model able to describe how certain determinants affect the financial 
stability at system level through the Δ"#$%&.  
The Hausman test accepts the null hypothesis, so the Random Effects model is the most 
suitable, then the Breusch-Pagan test confirmed that Random Effects is better than pooled OLS 
method. Finally, we need to control for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems, 
obtaining that there is no autocorrelation but heteroskedasticity problem.  
For this reason, as previously performed, we employ a PCSEs (Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors) regression that help us to correct and performs better estimates, correcting for 
heteroskedasticity problem.  
The Table 22 shows the final estimates of our panel regression:  
 

















Constant  .0269911 
Observations 225 
R-squared 0.6688 
Source: own elaboration 
 
As we can highlight from these results, the most important variables are significant at 1% and 
5% significance level such as: bank stability (ZSCORE), bank profitability (ROA), asset size 
(SIZE), credit risk (CRISK) and Value at Risk (VaR).  
In addition, the high R-squared equal to 66.88% shows a high degree of variability explained 
by the model.  
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The results for each independent variable, and their economic implications, according to the 
PCSE regression, are reported below.  
 
v 5<"(&)$C: as it is clearly intuitive, the relationship between the systemic risk and the 
variable that is used as proxy for financial stability at individual level is significant at 1% 
significance level and negative. This confirmed what we expect, as financial stability of a 
bank increases, its contribution to systemic risk decreases.  
 
v &('$C: the coefficient is clearly negative and significant at 5% significance level, showing 
that a high operating profit margin can reduce systemic risk since it shields banks from 
defaulting. Empirical results reveal that profitability (ROA) is negatively associated with 
banks’ contribution to systemic risk. As firm’s current book profitability improves, their 
contribution to systemic risk tend to decline.  
One intuitive explanation for this finding is that, as banks’ profitability increases, they 
engage in less-risk taking at the individual bank level, and thereby reducing their systemic 
risk contribution.  
 
v <_5)$C: the impact of size on systemic risk is increasing and the result obtained confirmed 
our expectation. We have a positive and significant result at 1% significance level.  
Larger size implies greater systemic importance, that the contribution to system-wide risk 
increases more than proportionately with relative size, and that a positive relationship 
between size and systemic importance is a robust result.  
 
v "&_<â$C: as explained above, the credit risk is the ratio between impaired loans and gross 
loans. The coefficient obtained from this analysis is obviously positive and significant at 
1% significance level.  
The growth of credit and the easy access to financing observed before the subprime crisis 
could have increased substantially the role of this variable as a significant determinant of 
bank’s contribution to systemic risk. 
A great increase in the impaired loans could leads to a subsequent increase in the systemic 
risk, since banks have collected lots of deteriorated loans that make them more exposed to 
systemic risk. In this way, an increase in the credit risk reduces the financial stability 
measured at system level.  
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v =_$$C: the result shows that non-traditional activities (i.e. trading and securitization, 
investment banks, brokerage or advisory activities) has a positive contribution to systemic 
risk. Our results followed DeYoung and Roland (2001), they find that banks non-traditional 
sources of income increase revenue volatility and consequently increase the systemic risk, 
reducing the financial stability at system level.  
 
v $%&$C: on the most important variable to analyse in relation with the systemic risk is the 
Value at Risk (i.e. idiosyncratic risk of an individual financial institution). As expected the 
VaR of a bank contributes positively to the systemic risk at 1% significance level. 
As VaR increases, the financial stability at system level increases as well, more than 
proportionally.  Riskier banks contribute more to systemic risk.  
 
v )'$C: the relationship obtained between capital adequacy and systemic risk is negative, 
demonstrating that the systemic risk is lower for the banks with high capital adequacy ratios. 
This result supports the hypothesis that a well-capitalized bank finds it costlier to take on 
high risk, and it underscores that high capital adequacy indicates a capital buffer against the 
profitability of a bank’s failure.  
 
v õ=I_?1$C10: for this variable we consider its lagged value, the intuition behind this 
assumption is that an increase in the economic growth of Italy contributes to decrease its 
systemic risk. Economic activity and financial stability typically exhibit a positive 
relationship. In the event of an economic downturn, borrowers may fail to meet loan 
repayment obligation that can ultimately lead to a systemic failure of the banks. Moreover, 
economic growth improves the quality of the loan portfolio, decreasing the ratio of non-














After the theoretical introduction regarding bank profitability and financial stability, we have 
made an overview about the Italian Banking System, since our empirical analysis is focused on 
the Italian case. Finally, after presenting the literature review about them, we proceeded with 
the core of our work: analyzing the impact of certain internal and external determinants that 
affect bank profitability and financial stability.  
It is generally agreed that a strong and healthy financial system is a prerequisite for the 
sustainable economic growth of a given country. In order to survive negative shocks and 
maintain a good financial stability, it is important to identify the determinants that mostly 
influence the overall performance and profitability of banks.  
For that matter, the analysis made specifies the empirical framework to investigate the effect of 
bank specific and macroeconomic variables upon bank profitability and financial stability of 
Italian banks for the following period 2006-2019. 
For the financial stability analysis, in order to make a more complete overview, we have 
considered the idiosyncratic and systemic dimension, since the risk related to the entire system 
cannot be considered at the individual level due to its endogenous nature.     
The individual dimension is assessed with the Z-score measure, which stands for bank stability. 
Then, we estimate the contribution to systemic risk of Italian banks using ∆"#$%& which is a 
market-based measure to assess the contribution of a single bank to the systemic risk. This 
measure could be useful to control the dynamics of the systemic risk as perceived by the market.  
∆"#$%& measures the contribution of bank i to the financial system VaR when bank i is in a 
state of distress. We define “system” as the set of all Italian banks considered in our sample. 
We find that the information contained in ∆"#$%& is different from that contained in VaR. 
Therefore, regulators should take it into account in order to monitor the systemic risk posed by 
banks. Finally, we conclude that ∆"#$%& is a very useful policy tool for regulators that can 
estimate which factors are more relevant in terms of contribution to systemic risk. Moreover, 
since our conditional measure of systemic risk is time varying and affected by market-based 
risk factors, macro prudential regulation and banking should also look at information provided 
by financial markets.  
The econometric analysis, introduced and deepened in Chapter 4, provided an interesting 
insight into the determinants that affect bank profitability and then financial stability.  
For each analysis implemented, we obtained the pooled OLS estimates, to have a general 
picture of relationships we wanted to characterize; then we proceeded with the performance of 
 111 
the models usually used for a panel data analysis; Fixed Effects and Random Effects models. 
At the end, after the performance of some important robustness tests, we considered appropriate 
to take the Fixed Effect model for the first two analysis and the Random Effect for the last one. 
Despite this, diagnostic tests arose some issued connected to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation between errors, producing potentially biased estimates; to overcome these 
problems, a Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) model was used and generally it delivered 
results consistent with what we obtained in the previous analysis.  
Then, after conducting three separate analysis for respectively, bank profitability, financial 
stability at individual level and financial stability at system level, we wanted to investigate the 
relationship between bank profitability and financial stability.  
The empirical results that we have obtained confirm the findings highlighted in the literature 
review. First, profitability (ROA) is positively associated to bank stability measured by Z-score 
and negatively associated to contribution to the systemic risk measured by ∆"#$%&. As bank’s 
current book profitability improves, their contribution to systemic risk tend to decline. One 
possible explanation of this result is that, as banks’ profitability increases, they engage in less 
risk-taking activities at the individual level, increasing the bank stability, and thereby reducing 
their systemic risk contribution. Then, as expected, high funding costs are associated with lower 
profitability, which follows directly from the accounting relationship of bank profits and losses.  
Second, a high value of income diversification tends to be associated with higher bank 
profitability, lower bank stability and higher contribution to systemic risk. In particular, over 
the last two decades, banks have diversified their operations all around the world including 
Italy. From our results, we found that income diversification increases the bank profitability of 
the Italian banks. Income diversification is creating pool of modern banking revenue sources 
along with the traditional banking activities for sound financial performance of the banks. 
Income diversification in banking sector refers to increasing shares of fees, net trading profits, 
exchange incomes, commission and charges, and other non-interest income within net 
operating income of a bank. An important source of diversification for the banks is considered 
as non-interest incomes. Depending on the results of our ROA model, we can imply that Italian 
banks benefit from diversifying their activities  beyond the traditional lending activities. But at 
the same time, this benefit leads to more idiosyncratic and systemic risk that is naturally 
embedded into the non-interest income activities.  
Third, as highlighted in each analysis, the credit risk variable, that is the ratio of impaired loans 
to gross loans, decreases bank profitability and bank stability of Italian banks, and clearly 
increases their systemic risk. As we have noticed in Chapter 2, the double-dip recession that 
has hit Italy between 2008 and 2014 severely impaired Italian banks’ balance sheet and loan 
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quality. Consequently, in order to increase their profitability, banks should be careful with the 
quality of the loans they grant.  
Finally, consistent with the literature, a more favorable macroeconomic environment is 
associated with higher profitability and bank stability, and lower systemic risk, as we have 
obtained from our results.  
All things considered in our analysis are coherent with the literature review analyzed, as far as 
our models try to explain in a simplified way a more complex phenomenon, which is the 
relationship between bank profitability and financial stability. 
In particular, this analysis is considered a more complete analysis about the Italian Banking 
System, since does not take into account only bank profitability or financial stability, but both 
of them, showing that bank profitability matters for financial stability. 
In the end, we can conclude that the main aim of our analysis has been met, leading interesting 
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Appendix 3: List of Italian banks in our sample 
 
NAME TICKER mCap 
UniCredit SPA I:UCG 18,533 
Intesa Sanpaolo I:ISP 30,313 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena I:BMPS 44,802 
Unione di Banche Italiane I:UBI 3,479 
Mediobanca I:MB 5,836 
BPER Banca SPA I:BPE 1,118 
Banca Mediolanum SPA I:BMED 4,644 
Credito Emiliano SPA I:CE 1,436 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio I:BPSO 841,484 
Credito Valtellinese I:CVAL 388,629 
Banca Carige SPA I:CRG 82,899 
Banca di Desio e della Brianza I:BDB 257,400 
Banca Ifis SPA I:IF 480,264 
Banco di Sardegna I:BSRP 57,156 
Banca Profilo SPA I:PRO 135,193 
Banca Intermobiliare I:BIM 65,459 
Banca Generali I:BANC 2,998 
Banca Finnat EuroAmerica I:BFE 84,188 
Banco BPM SPA I:BP 1,983 
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